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LAWS AS APPLIED TO PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS LEAGUE LOCKOUTS AND
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO PREVENT
THEIR OCCURRENCE
JO-ANNIE CHARBONNEAU*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years, three of the four major North American professional
sports leagues experienced a lockout; the National Football League (NFL) and
the National Basketball Association (NBA) locked out their players in 2011,1
while the National Hockey League (NHL) imposed a similar treatment in 2012.2
Lockouts have proven over the years to provide significant leverage to the
leagues, the players’ employers, during the negotiation process. Currently, all
leagues have agreed on a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the
players associations and are experiencing work peace. However, due to the
ongoing growth of the sports industry and the exponential amount of money that
these professional sports leagues and clubs generate,3 there will always be
*Obtained her LL.M. in Sports Law from Marquette University Law School in 2014 and her LL.L.
and J.D. from the University of Ottawa (Canada) in 2011 and 2012. She would like to thank Matthew
J. Mitten for his time in reviewing this work and for his great advice. She would also like to thank
Benoit Girardin, her boss and mentor, for his support. Finally, she would like to sincerely thank her
parents, Ginette and Richard, for the unconditional love and support and for allowing her to pursue her
dreams. A special thanks to her family and friends who have always been there for her. The Author’s
native language is French, so European spelling is used for some words throughout the Article.
1. Alexandra Baumann, Play Ball: What Can Be Done to Prevent Strikes and Lockouts in
Professional Sports and Keep the Stadium Lights on, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 251,
268 (2012).
2. Christopher Botta, NHL Lockout: Gary Bettman Is Going Nowhere—No Matter What, SPORTING
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.sportingnews.com/nhl/story/2012-10-29/nhl-lockout-news-2012gary-bettman-criticism-hockey-strike-david-stern-retire.
3. The revenues for the NFL were evaluated at $9 billion for the year 2013. Monte Burke, How the
National Football League Can Reach $25 Billion in Annual Revenues, FORBES (Aug. 17, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/monteburke/2013/08/17/how-the-national-football-league-can-reach-25billion-in-annual-revenues/. The NHL revenues were evaluated at $3.7 billion for the 2013–2014
season. James Mirtle, Report: NHL Revenues to Hit Record $3.7-Billion, GLOBE & MAIL (June 9,
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tension between players and club owners, as both want to get a bigger part of
the revenue. Different reasons motivate them; players seek a bigger percentage
of the shared revenue because they are the product of the leagues, and the
leagues, as the employers, seek a bigger percentage of the shared revenue
because they manage the league. As seen in recent years, lockouts are the most
common weapon used by leagues to gain leverage during a CBA negotiation.
In North America, the four major professional sports leagues provide the highest
level of competition for athletes. The leagues monopolize the market of
professional sports; currently there are no other valid options for players to
compete professionally. There are other sports leagues in Europe, but they are
not as competitive as the leagues in North America. The only league that does
not have control of the market is Major League Soccer (MLS) because better
options exist for players in Europe, where the highest level of soccer is played.
As a result, players and players associations have started bringing actions under
both antitrust and labor laws to counterbalance this power. The choice to sue
under a particular law is made once players have been locked out and a CBA
expires.
Another consideration that players associations and leagues must take into
account in the four major North American professional sports leagues is the fact
that most leagues have teams in two different countries: Canada and the United
States. The NBA and MLB each have one team in the Province of Ontario. The
NFL used to have a team that played home games in the Province of Ontario, a
scenario that could be reproduced because the NFL is open to playing home
games outside of the United States of America.4 However, the biggest impact
of this situation is observed within the NHL. Out of the thirty NHL teams, seven
teams are located in five provinces of Canada: Alberta, British Columbia,
Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec. The number of Canadian teams could grow in
upcoming years as Canadian cities have demonstrated an interest to the NHL to
obtain a hockey team during the new appeal-for-interest process for potential
expansion. The Canadian teams are important markets for the NHL because they

2014), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/hockey/globe-on-hockey/report-nhl-revenues-to-hitrecord-37-billion/article19080171/. The revenues of the NBA were evaluated at $4.6 billion for the
year 2013. Kurt Badenhausen, As Stern Says Goodbye, Knicks, Lakers Set Records as NBA's Most
Valuable Teams,
FORBES
(Jan.
22,
2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2014/01/22/as-stern-says-goodbye-knicks-lakers-set-records-as-nbas-most-valuableteams/. The revenues of Major League Baseball (MLB) were evaluated at $8.5 billion for the year
2013. Maury Brown, Major League Baseball Sees Record Revenues Exceed $8 Billion for 2013,
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2013/12/17/major-league-baseball-sees-record-revenues-exceed-8-billion-for-2013/.
4. See Kevin Patra, Buffalo Bills Terminate Toronto Series, NFL, (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000438147/article/buffalo-bills-terminate-toronto-series.
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generate a great portion of the NHL’s total revenues.5 Nevertheless, the
presence of these teams in Canada is enough to require club owners and players
associations to comply with Canadian laws. During past lockouts, the NHL
mostly ignored Canadian laws. A similar situation is unlikely to occur again in
upcoming years. As this Article will establish, Canada has concurrent
jurisdiction with the United States over professional sports leagues. To
demonstrate this concurrent jurisdiction, this Article uses the NHL as a case
study.
Part II will first analyze the legal issues that arise under labor laws in the
different provinces of Canada and the federal jurisdiction of the United States.
In Canada, each province regulates labor relations. The individual provincial
labor regulations may create difficulties for trans-provincial companies because
each province is independent in how it controls these relations. In the United
States, one labor relations law regulates all states. Consequently, labor issues,
such as procedures to declare a lockout and the remedies to stop a lockout, are
different throughout Canada and the United States. Part II will explain the
different laws and the different systems that govern labor laws. Once these laws
are defined, an analysis of the concurrent jurisdiction between these two
countries will be provided. Over the years, Provincial Canadian jurisprudence
has established jurisdiction over labor relations matters that occur in Canadian
territory. This issue is central to this Article because contrary to what happened
in the previous lockout, the NHL shall comply with Canadian laws as well as
American law. Furthermore, Part II will discuss the different claims, arguments,
and remedies under the labor laws of both countries and the role of concurrent
jurisdiction in these claims. Concurrent jurisdiction provides opportunities for
players associations to gain leverage in a work stoppage situation.
Part III of this Article will examine the legal issues that arise under the
antitrust laws in Canada and the United States. In Canada and the United States,
antitrust is federally regulated. The issues that arise under American antitrust
law regard agreements between multiple owners to operate a certain way and to
declare a lockout. The central issue in the United States is when antitrust law
may be applied because, as long as a league and a players association are in a
labor relationship, the non-statutory labor exemption applies and antitrust
claims cannot be brought. Once the labor relationship ends, antitrust claims may
be a weapon for players to stop a lockout. All of these issues will be addressed
in Part III. As for the antitrust issue in Canada, because there is no equivalent to
5. See Mike Ozanian, The Most Valuable Teams in the NHL, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2014/11/25/the-most-valuable-teams-in-the-nhl/.
The
revenues generated by the seven Canadian NHL hockey teams were evaluated at $922 million.
This means that 24.92% of the NHL’s revenue is coming from Canadian teams. This value does not
account for broadcasting and sponsorship deals from Canadian corporations.
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the non-statutory labor exemption, the main problem is evaluating if a lockout
was the result of a conspiracy. If a conspiracy is found, the issue is how
Canadian law is applied to stop a lockout. The laws of both countries will be
analyzed to set the basis of any possible legal claims. When the principles and
different claims have been established, arguments and remedies will be
developed. Concurrent jurisdiction will be addressed in Part III; however, unlike
labor law, there is no significant difference that will permit a party to gain
leverage by bringing a claim in one country instead of the other, even though
the vast majority of antitrust claims are usually brought under American law.
The main point of this Article is that in recent years, lockouts have occurred
in multiple professional sports leagues. In each lockout, Canadian laws were
overlooked because the majority of the professional sports teams are located in
the United States. In the 2005 NHL lockout, the NHL never considered
Canadian laws. In the 2012 NHL lockout, the NHL only considered Ontario
labor relations laws but did not consider the provincial nature of labor relations.
By locking out its players in 2005 and 2012, the NHL gained unfair negotiating
leverage. The lockout was detrimental to the players because they could not
play; thus, the players did not earn a salary. The salary losses forced the players
to agree to certain conditions that they might not have agreed to under different
circumstances, such as the salary cap and the minimum and maximum salaries.
Nevertheless, even though the NHL has unfair negotiating power, a lockout is a
legitimate means for the NHL and other leagues to obtain what they want. To
counterbalance the unfair negotiation power, this Article will demonstrate that
Canadian laws cannot be overlooked and there are more effective means to fight
a lockout under Canadian labor laws. Consequently, it is possible for both sides
to gain leverage at any point during the negotiation process. In terms of antitrust
law, if a decertification is agreed upon, players will have more effective means
to fight a lockout in the United States. It is up to the players associations and the
players to decide which strategy will be more beneficial to them to obtain as
much leverage as possible. However, it is evident that if the laws remain
unchanged, the best strategy for players who want to stay unionized will be to
fight a lockout under labor laws.
II. LEGALITY OF NHL LOCKOUT UNDER AMERICAN AND CANADIAN LABOR
LAWS
A CBA governs the relations between a professional sports league and a
players association. As a result, club owners and players are bound by it. Labor
laws regulate the collective bargaining process. Canada and the United States
have a different set of laws that are not based on the same jurisdiction. However,
in both countries, it is the players’ decision whether or not to unionize. In the
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United States, labor law falls under federal jurisdiction, while in Canada,
provinces regulate labor law. Each province has its own set of laws.
A. American Labor Law
Labor relations have been tense in the United States as early as the 1920s
during the Industrial Revolution. At the time, employees did not receive any
protection for their work. There were no relationships between employees and
their employers. Employees became upset because of poor working conditions,
which created a lot of violence. To bring peace into labor relations, Congress
adopted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932.6 A few years later, in 1935,
President Roosevelt enacted a law to regulate all labor relations in the United
States and permit unionization; this law was entitled the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).7 The NLRA allows workers to unionize, meaning they
can agree that an organization will be designated as their representative for any
labor relations dispute with an employer.
It must be mentioned that Congress established two main premises to
accompany the NLRA. Congress first said that the government should not
interfere when the parties negotiate terms of employment in good faith. 8 When
two parties decide to be bound by a CBA and engage in the collective bargaining
process, Congress will not get involved. Congress gives full freedom to the
parties to negotiate the terms they want to include in a CBA, as long as the CBA
respects the process established in the NLRA. Secondly, Congress stated that
the bargaining power should be of the same level.9 Through the NLRA,
Congress meant to level the bargaining power between employers and their
employees. Even if the bargaining power may never be equal between the two
sides, the NLRA offers protection to employees and gives them some rights and
benefits they would not otherwise have. Congress has never intervened in any
individual labor dispute. Courts have the authority to review labor relations
disputes. Courts will leave the parties to negotiate their own CBA. Therefore,
the remedies under American labor law are limited to administrative and judicial
claims.
The NLRA is central to labor relations; it created the National Labor

6. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (effective Mar. 23, 1932). With this law in place,
courts were only able to grant injunctions to end strikes involving violence or fraud. Baumann, supra
note 1, at 254. As such, the Norris-LaGuardia Act helped bring some peace to the labor industry. Id.
7. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006).
8. Michael H. LeRoy, The Narcotic Effect of Antitrust Law in Professional Sports: How the Sherman
Act Subverts Collective Bargaining, 86 TUL. L. REV. 859, 875 (2012).
9. Id.
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Relations Board (NLRB).10 The NLRB’s mission is to enforce the NLRA’s
provisions, which encompass employees’ rights and ensure good faith
bargaining from both sides, but mostly from the employers. One of the most
important powers of the NLRB is to certify unions.11 Under this power, once a
union is certified as the official bargaining representative of employees to
negotiate with an employer, no other representative or individual employee may
do so. As with any other industry, it must be noted that players decide and
voluntarily choose to unionize. Once a majority of players decides to unionize,
a labor organization is chosen to represent them. The organization then applies
for certification with the NLRB. Once this process is achieved and the NLRB
recognizes the union, the certified union is the only unit that can represent the
employees to the employer. In professional sports, certification means that
leagues can only negotiate with players associations; leagues cannot negotiate
with players individually.12 Once the NLRB certifies a union, the NLRB grants
the union the right to act on behalf of the union’s members.13 The union and the
employer are mandated to negotiate a CBA. The NLRB, as a federal agency,
establishes the mandatory subjects14 that must be negotiated in a CBA. These
mandatory subjects are wages, hours, and conditions of employment. All other
legal issues are considered permissive subjects, meaning that an employer and
union may or may not choose to negotiate these terms. An example of a
permissive subject is the determination of the negotiators. As it can be noted,
American labor relations laws are mostly procedural. Consequently, the laws
provide both parties latitude in their negotiations, allowing them to reach the
best deal possible.
In terms of professional sports leagues, the NLRB established its
jurisdiction to oversee league disputes in the 1970s in American League of
Professional Baseball Clubs and Ass’n of National Baseball League Umpires.15
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169. See also Gabriel Feldman, Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA: The
Shifting Dynamics in Labor-Management Relations in Professional Sports, 86 TUL. L. REV. 831,
838–89 (2012).
11. MATTHEW J. MITTEN, TIMOTHY DAVIS, RODNEY K. SMITH & N. JEREMI DURU, SPORTS
LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 487 (3d ed. 2013).
12. Morio v. N. Am. Soccer League, 501 F. Supp. 633, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). In this case, the North
American Soccer League (NASL) tried to avoid bargaining with the players association and negotiated
directly with the players. Id. at 637. The court enjoined the NASL from doing so. Id. at 640. It stated
that the league’s “duty to bargain with the exclusive representative carries with it the negative duty not
to bargain with individual employees.” Id. at 639 (citing Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678 (1944); NLRB v. Acme Air Appliance Co., 117 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1941)).
13. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 547.
14. There are no equivalent mandatory subjects in the provincial laws in Canada.
15. See generally 180 N.L.R.B. 190 (1969). In this case, the American League Umpires sought
recognition as a union, but the league already had a system for self-regulation of umpire disputes. Id.
at 190–91. The NLRB concluded in this case that baseball was a business engaged in interstate
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In this case, the MLB umpires sought recognition of their union by the NLRB.16
The NLRB established that professional sports affect interstate commerce.17 As
a result, professional sports should be subject to the NLRB’s jurisdiction.18 The
NLRB exercised its jurisdiction, even though an MLB club was located in
Canada.19 Another element the NLRB considered to assert jurisdiction was the
lack of internal regulation of disputes by MLB.20 The NLRB found that MLB
solely designed the system, and the system did not include anything on how to
deal with labor disputes.21 MLB tried to qualify the umpires as supervisors to
exempt them from the NLRA.22 Its argument was unsuccessful.23 As a result,
the NLRB took full jurisdiction over the matter and permitted the umpires to
unionize,24 even though the Major League Baseball Players Association was
recognized by MLB.
This decision allowed the players association to be recognized by the NLRB
as well as its respective league.25 Consequently, the NLRB gave the players
protection under the NLRA by asserting jurisdiction over labor relations in
professional sports. The ruling of the case determined that because MLB held
games in more than one state, MLB engaged in interstate commerce.26 As the
NLRB stated, “[F]uture labor disputes . . . will be national in scope, radiating
their impact far beyond individual State boundaries.”27 Also, MLB is an
industry that relies on interstate travel.28 The NLRB finally mentioned, “The
Employer’s final contention, that Board processes are unsuited to regulate
effectively baseball’s international aspects, clearly lacks merit, as many if not
most of the industries subject to the Act have similar international features.”29
As a result, the NLRB could derive its jurisdictional power based on that
particular decision. The NLRB could not avoid deciding a case involving
commerce, meaning that the business was conducted in more than one state. Id. at 192.
16. Id. at 190.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 191.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 192.
23. Id. at 193.
24. Id.
25. Gregory Boucher, Baseball, Antitrust and the Rise of the Players’ Association, 2008 DENV. U.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 121, 129 (2008).
26. Am. League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 180 N.L.R.B. at 192.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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professional sports that have the same characteristics. The four major North
American professional sports leagues are governed by the NLRA, which means
that the NLRB has jurisdiction to oversee issues deriving from the labor
relations between leagues and players associations. Based on American
jurisprudence, the NLRB has jurisdiction to intervene on issues that arise both
within and outside the United States. To do so, a court must consider the effects
of the conduct complained about in the United States. A court must determine
if the conduct “negated or substantially qualified the presumption against
extraterritoriality under the NLRA.”30 The effect must be considerable.
As demonstrated in American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
under labor law, it is important to consider some factors that are specific to
professional sports. One element is multi-employer bargaining, which means
that a bargaining group is set by a group of employees to represent and bind
them with a union. In the NHL, multi-employer bargaining means that all club
owners agree to bargain with one group, the National Hockey League Players’
Association (NHLPA) that represents the players, and recognize the NHLPA’s
power to negotiate and conclude agreements for the players. As a result, the
NHL clubs bargain as a joint employer. The NHLPA has established that, in
professional sports, even though clubs operate independently and look to
enhance their own viability and interest, clubs also need each other for the
league to function properly and efficiently.31 Clubs need common rules to
operate and also to further the objective of the league to have competitive
balance. Competitive balance is an important factor because a league and the
teams would not generate as much revenue if competition on the ice is not
high-level and not exciting to spectators. As a result, the NLRB concluded that
all individual teams constitute a single employer unit in terms of bargaining
purposes.32 In North American Soccer League, the NLRB discussed how a joint
employer relationship is formed.33 The criterion is the degree of control one
employer has over labor relations rules.34 The NLRB found that the NASL had
enough control over these issues to be recognized as a joint employer.35 Control
30. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, RE: COLBY ARMSTRONG ET AL AND THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION VS. CLUB DE HOCKEY CANADIEN INC. AND THE NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
(C.M. NO, CM-2012-4431) par. 19 (2012).
31. See Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 248 (1996).
32. N. Am. Soccer League v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1379, 1383 (5th Cir. 1980). In this case, the NASL
disputed the certification that was granted by the NLRB to the National American Soccer League
Players Association to represent all NASL players of clubs located in the United States. Id. at
1380–81. The court concluded that “a league-wide [sic] bargaining unit as appropriate is reasonable.”
Id. at 1383.
33. Id. at 1382.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1383.
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is exercised through standard player contracts, the submission of players’
contracts to the NASL Commissioner, and the NASL’s broad player discipline
power.36 Consequently, if a league has such control, it will be considered a
single employer unit.37
Another element to consider in professional sports is that a league is unique
in nature and, as mentioned previously, needs the interdependence of the teams
to conduct an effective business and provide an interesting and relevant product.
Generally, if employers group together to form a single bargaining unit, the
grouping would constitute an antitrust violation. The main reason why club
owners group together is to provide an attractive product to consumers, such as
exciting games among the member clubs of a league. Under the NLRA, a CBA
that is negotiated by a multi-employer would not bind the parties unless all the
parties agreed to it. In the case of the NHL and the NHLPA, the parties
voluntarily accepted a CBA in 1967. Because this acceptation has not been
contested, it is an admissible fact that both parties agreed to be bound by the
CBA. It must be noted that the NHLPA never bargained with an individual club,
neither in Canada nor the United States.
The NLRB has the authority to oversee unfair labor practices38 and to
review the scope of bargaining.39 For example, an unfair labor practice is failing
to bargain in good faith by either party during the collective bargaining process.
The duty to bargain in good faith does not, however, include the legal duty to
submit a reasonable proposal or to agree to any terms. The elements of the duty
to negotiate in good faith include meeting with the other party to negotiate and
meeting at a reasonable time. The scope of bargaining over mandatory issues
includes wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. Any party may
bring an administrative claim to the NLRB regarding an unfair labor practice
and the scope of review. Similar arguments, depending on the facts, will be
brought by either party. As American labor law is highly procedural, one party
may argue that the other did not follow the proper process during a negotiation.
The arguments will be related to bad faith bargaining by one party, i.e., delaying
the process, missing a negotiation meeting, or failing to cooperate. Bad faith
bargaining is difficult to prove because one fact alone might not be sufficient,
but the combination of multiple factors may be enough to establish a claim on
the merits. Anyhow, if an administrative claim before the NLRB fails, a party

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act gave the NLRB
jurisdiction over unions and employers in regards to unfair labor practices. Id.
39. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 486.
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may bring a similar claim in federal court.40 Either through an administrative
claim or a judicial claim, a party is typically seeking an order to stop the
behavior of the other party.
In the NHL, players considered unionization beginning in the 1950s.41 At
that time, the players did not have the same working conditions as today. The
salaries were not the same, and playing conditions were not as good; hockey
was considered a dangerous physical contact sport because in the 1950s, players
did not have the same protective equipment as today. Players wanted to obtain
more guarantees for their life after they retired from the NHL. In 1957, Doug
Harvey and Ted Lindsay, two NHL hockey players, sued the NHL because it
refused to give players a pension plan.42 Their efforts were counterbalanced by
the NHL’s actions. The NHL forced the players’ teams to trade them.43 The
NHL also forced the Detroit Red Wings to disassociate from the players’
movement.44 As a result, the first effort to unionize did not work.
The NHLPA that we know today was formed in 1967.45 The goal of the
NHLPA was to obtain better salaries and guarantee more protection for the
players. Bob Pulford, the Executive Director of the NHLPA at the time, ensured
that the union would be recognized because he met with the owners and asked
them for recognition and guarantees that players would not be penalized for
being a union member.46 The owners agreed. Through union representation,
players obtain the rights and benefits that are provided by the NLRA. The
NHLPA has the power to collectively bargain an agreement on behalf of the
players that will set the different conditions of their employment.47 The players
obtain the right to strike, while the NHL has the right to lockout players.48

40. An unfair labor practice claim is filed with the NLRB. When the NLRB receives a claim, it will
investigate the allegations. Once an investigation is completed, the NLRB will determine if it will
proceed through consent procedures or formal procedures. In a consent procedure, the parties waive
their right to a formal hearing. In a formal procedure, the parties go through a formal hearing. An
administrative law judge presides over a hearing. The administrative law judge will either impose a
cease and desist order of the unfair labor practice or dismiss the unfair labor practice claim. If either
party does not agree or does not comply with the order, a federal court of appeals court may review the
NLRB’s decision and decide to enforce, set aside, or remand the decision to the NLRB.
41. Inside NHLPA, NHLPA, http://www.nhlpa.com/inside-nhlpa (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
42. Daniel Wyatt, Ted Lindsay and the First NHL Players’ Association, DANIEL WYATT; HIGH ON
HIST. (July 20, 2013), http://danielwyatt.blogspot.com/2013/07/ted-lindsay-and-first-nhl-players.html.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Inside NHLPA, supra note 41.
46. NHLPA, WATERFRONT BIA, http://www.waterfrontbia.com/directory.asp?idn=1467&pg=10
(last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
47. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (1947).
48. Id.
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Furthermore, the NLRA prohibits employers from sanctioning employees who
want to unionize;49 as a result, the actions of the NHL in the 1950s would not
be permitted now. A union permits the creation of a strong force against owners
or an employer. Multiple employees allow for a stronger voice than one
employee negotiating alone.
A players association has a duty to fairly represent any current or
prospective players. In the NHL, the NHLPA is the labor organization that
represents the players in their collective bargaining negotiations with the NHL.
Furthermore, just as the players have the right to choose to unionize, they have
the equivalent right to forgo union representation at any given point in time.
There are two ways players can dissolve their union, either through a disclaimer
of interest or through decertification.50 This process will be elaborated further
in detail in the antitrust section, as it is an important factor to determine when
players can bring antitrust claims.
1. Legal Remedies to Prevent or Stop an NHL Lockout
Under American labor law, as mentioned previously, there are only two
ways to bring a claim before the NLRB, either through an unfair labor practice
or scope of bargaining claim. Both parties, either a league or a players
association, may bring a claim before the NLRB. In terms of a lockout, only an
unfair labor practice claim would apply. Section 8(d) of the NLRA imposes an
obligation on both parties to negotiate in good faith.51 This remedy would be the
best way for a league to force a players association to negotiate. This would not
end a lockout, but it would put pressure on a players association and force it to
sit at the negotiation table, even though players might still be locked out. It
would be a strong tactic for a league to bring an unfair labor practice claim and
still lock out the players because the league would gain more bargaining power.
Taking the 2012 NHL lockout for example, the NHL could have argued that
the players association was not bargaining in good faith because the players
filed multiple labor relations claims in different instances, which could be
defined as an uncooperative negotiation practice. The players looked at
alternative ways to enjoin the league from locking them out instead of putting
all their efforts into the negotiation process. The league could have brought a
claim, even though a lockout was already in place. The league would have
gained even more bargaining power. This would have been a remedy to counter
the efforts of the players association’s claims against the league. If the NHL had
49. Id.
50. Gabriel Feldman, Antitrust Versus Labor Law in Professional Sports: Balancing the Scales After
Brady v. NFL and Anthony v. NBA, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221, 1256 (2012).
51. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
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engaged in unfair labor practices, the players association could have also
brought a claim under this provision.
Pursuing the same synopsis as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the
players association could have argued that the league never bargained in good
faith because it was clear the league intended to lock out the players on a
particular date. Also, the players association could have argued that the league
had a history of locking out its players.52 Under the same commissioner, the
NHL experienced three lockouts. This trend shows that the league used lockouts
as a common tactic and not as a pressure measure for a particular situation. The
league knew that a lockout would give it bargaining power, and the league
decided to lock out the players without negotiating fairly with the NHLPA from
the beginning. It would be hard for the NHLPA to establish because lockouts
are a pressure tactic permitted under the NLRA.
Because the NLRA specifically permits a lockout, there are not many
remedies that players can bring to prevent or stop a lockout under American
labor law. As established in American Ship Building Co.,53 a lockout is legal
even if it is used to put economic pressure on employees. The Court said that
the “use of the lockout does not carry with it any necessary implication that the
employer acted to discourage union membership or otherwise discriminate
against union members as such.”54 Therefore, because the league made its
intention of locking the players out clear, the argument that the league bargained
in bad faith may not be a compelling argument to convince the NLRB. It seems
like the NLRA, which was enacted to help employees gain leverage in the
bargaining process, gives an employer more power and measures to help
employees modify their demands. Because a lockout is protected and almost
impossible to fight under labor laws, it seems that the main goal of the NLRA
is no longer fulfilled. As a result, due to all the elements mentioned previously,
it seems that the main goal of the NLRA, to give resources to employees and
empower them in their relation with their employer, is not fulfilled to the same

52. Pro Sports Lockouts and Strikes Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/03/us/prosports-lockouts-and-strikes-fast-facts/ (last updated Jan. 28, 2015). The NHL experienced three
lockouts since 1992. The first one was during the 1994–1995 season; this lockout lasted 103 days. Id.
The second lockout was during the 2004–2005 season. Id. This lockout lasted 310 days. Id. The third
lockout was during the 2012–2013 season. Id. During this lockout, 526 regular season games were
canceled. Id.
53. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 312 (1965). In this case, the employer who
operated a shipyard company wanted a new agreement with its unions. Id. at 302. When the
negotiations reached an impasse, the employer closed down one of its yards and laid off some
employees for a temporary period. Id. at 303–04. The employees argued that the employer did so
because it knew that a strike was coming. Id. The employer argued that it did so to support its
bargaining position and put economic pressure on the employees. Id. at 304.
54. Id. at 312.
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extent as when it was enacted, based on the legality and legitimate means a
lockout provides to an employer.
B. Provincial Canadian Labor Law
The main difference between American and Canadian labor laws is
jurisdiction. In Canada, the provinces regulate labor law. Each province has its
own labor relations code or act. Each code or act must be interpreted according
to the legal system it is subject to. Provincial Canadian labor relations laws
apply to the players and teams that are located in and provide work services in
Canada. Even though the NLRB claimed jurisdiction and recognized the
extraterritoriality of the NLRA, the Canadian labor boards’ decisions must be
taken into account. Seven of the thirty NHL teams are located in Canada;
however, all of the Canadian teams generate more revenue than most of the
American teams.55 Canadian teams also have a gigantic fan base. Even when
the teams are not playing in Canada, there are huge impacts on revenues,
sponsorships, and broadcasts. Therefore, in the NHL, it can be argued that the
main effects of a lockout are felt in Canada. In the last NHL lockout, some
Canadian enterprises, such as restaurants and souvenir boutiques, surrounding
the NHL arenas closed due to the lack of business. These main economic effects
cannot be disregarded. Furthermore, Canadian NHL teams have lucrative
broadcasting deals. In 2014, the NHL entered into its most lucrative Canadian
television broadcasting deal with an agreement with Sportsnet to become the
official broadcaster of the NHL for the next twelve years. The deal was
evaluated at 5.2 billion dollars.56 Some broadcast television companies make
most of their revenues from televised hockey games. An NHL lockout results
in a direct negative impact on television revenues. Based on all of these
elements, Canadian laws may not be overlooked, although it seems they have
been overlooked in the previous lockouts.
1. Québec Labour Law
The Province of Québec is the only province that has a completely mixed
legal system of civil and common law. Common law is mostly used for issues
55. Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey Lockout of 2012–2013, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (July 2013),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2013/article/the-hockey-lockout-of-2012.htm. Jeff Klein established that
three of the NHL clubs are responsible for the generation of 80% of the NHL revenues. Id. Two of
those clubs are located in Canada, which are Montreal and Toronto. Id. Revenue generation in the
NHL is calculated differently than the other sports leagues, as the revenues are mostly derived from
attendance and local television agreements, whereas, in other professional sports leagues, revenue
generation comes from national television agreements. Id.
56. Deal Gives Rogers Rights to All NHL Games Through 2025–26, SPORTSNET (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.sportsnet.ca/hockey/nhl/deal-gives-rogers-rights-to-all-nhl-games-through-2025-26/.
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that are federal in nature, such as criminal law. On the other hand, labor law is
under the umbrella of the civil legal system. In Québec, any matters that result
out of labor law are codified in the Québec Labour Code.57 Originally, the labor
system was developed on two basic premises: minimum working conditions and
the autonomy of the parties involved in an employment relationship.58 The latter
premise is still predominant in the law, meaning that the law recognizes the
voluntary association of employees, the collective bargaining process, and the
pressure tactics that can be used by employees.59
To benefit from certain protections of the Québec Labour Code, a union
must be certified as the representative of that particular group of employees.
The employees must take a vote, and the majority must approve the unit that
will represent them. In this case, for the NHLPA to be the official unit, the
players would have to vote to elect this organization. Once the vote has passed,
an application must be filed to obtain certification to the Québec Labour
Relations Board. When a union is certified, employees may benefit from the
rights that are provided in the Québec Labour Code. For example, once certified,
players would acquire the right to strike, which would give the league the right
to lock out the players. Currently, the NHLPA is not a certified union under the
Québec Labour Code, which means that the players cannot be locked out and a
lockout is illegal.
Another codified provision regards arbitration. The Québec Labour Code
provides that its dispute resolution system is the exclusive means to settle
grievances resulting from a CBA. The law is clear on this subject: “Any dispute
shall be submitted to an arbitrator upon written application to the Minister by
the parties.”60 Therefore, if the NHLPA were a recognized union under the
Québec Labour Code,61 the NHL and the NHLPA would have to bring any of
their disputes to arbitration, not to court. Once a CBA expires, both parties may
agree to submit their disputes to arbitration; however, it is not mandatory.
Another provision that directly applies to professional sports concerns
organizations with multiple employers. The Québec Labour Code provides that
multi-employer certification is prohibited. This can be an issue in professional
sports because a professional sports league is a group of club owners who are
the employers. To have an efficient league, club owners must work together.
The multi-employer bargaining unit is pivotal to the NHL because the business

57. See generally Québec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 2009, c C-27 (Can.).
58. Mathieu Fournier & Dominic Roux, Labor Relations in the National Hockey League: A Model
of Transnational Collective Bargaining?, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 147, 149 (2009).
59. Id.
60. Québec Labour Code, R.S.Q. 2009, c C-27, art 74 (Can.).
61. See id.
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of clubs is so intertwined that they need to be governed by the same rules for
their best interest. One can argue that it would be more complex to have multiple
bargaining units and unions (i.e., thirty in the NHL); therefore, it is impossible
to imagine a non-multi-employer bargaining unit. If it were necessary, it would
mean that under the Québec Labour Code, it would be impossible for the
NHLPA to be recognized as a certified union, unless it created divisions specific
for each team.
During the last NHL lockout, the Montreal Canadiens players brought a
labor law claim against the Club de Hockey Canadien Inc. and the NHL.62 The
players claimed the lockout was illegal and sought an injunction to suspend the
lockout.63 The main argument raised by the Montreal Canadiens players and the
NHLPA was that the lockout was unlawful.64 Under the Québec Labour Code,
the Montreal Canadiens players are considered employees based on their
individual employment contracts.65 The NHLPA is the labor association that
represents these players.66 However, the NHLPA is not a certified union under
the Québec Labour Code.67 Concurrent jurisdiction was established because the
Labor Relations Commission ascertained the matter in front of it. The Québec
Labour Code applies to employers (i.e., the team) and employees (i.e., the
players) who work in Québec.68 As a result, in Québec, locking out employees
is prohibited because they did not acquire the right to strike, as the players
association is not a certified union. For this reason, “the players and the NHLPA
asked the [Québec Labour Relations] Board to step in.”69 The NHL argued that
it was not an employer as defined by the Québec Labour Code.70 According to
the NHL, the only employer that existed, as defined by the Québec Labour
Code, was the Montreal Canadiens.71 The Commission des relations du travail
ultimately concluded the Québec Labour Code applies to everyone and,
therefore, applied to the current dispute.72
62. Armstrong c. Club de Hockey Canadien Inc., 2012 QCCRT 0445 (Can.). In this case, the players
and the NHLPA sought a provisional order to prevent the league from locking the players out. Id. The
order was not granted at the preliminary hearing. Id. A final decision was never issued. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Danilo Di Vincenzo & Linda Bernier, The National Hockey League and the Montreal
Canadiens’ Hockey Club on the Labour Relations Board’s Ice, CANADIAN BAR ASS’N (Nov. 2012),
http://www.cba.org/CBA/sections_labour/newsletters2012/nhl.aspx.
69. Id.
70. Armstrong, 2012 QCCRT 0445.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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The NHL also argued that the Québec Labour Code did not apply because
the NHLPA was not a certified unit in Québec.73 The NHL then argued that it
negotiated a CBA with the NHLPA in 1967, so they had a contractual
relationship since then.74 As a result, one team should not be certified because
the NHLPA bargained with the league and not individual clubs for many years.75
The NHL also stated that because the CBA was expired, the NLRA permitted
such a pressing measure to force the NHLPA to negotiate.76 Finally, the NHL
argued that the NHLPA’s claims were a demonstration of its bad faith in the
negotiation process, as it was using the claim only to pressure the league.77 The
Commission des relations du travail rendered only an interlocutory decision.78
The parties were convened in that judgment for another ruling on the merits of
the case.79 The merits of the case were never decided, so there is no basic rule
to follow in terms of a claim in Québec. Furthermore, the Commission des
relations du travail did not grant the injunction sought by the players because
the NHL caused no harm.80
The Commission des relations du travail’s decision was one of the first
judgments involving professional athletes that could have opened the door for
the Commission des relations du travail to decide its jurisdiction and the
involvement of Québec law in professional sports leagues issues. The
Commission des relations du travail seemed compelled by the arguments of the
players and the NHLPA in regard to legal pluralism.81 The Commission des
relations du travail stated that it has exclusive jurisdiction in labor relations
matters that occur in Québec.82 However, the Commission des relations du
travail still needs to decide whether legislation applies in this case. The Québec
Labour Relations Board will have to establish how legislation applies to the
NHL. Based on the previous NHL lockout, because the NHLPA was not a
certified union, it seems that the lockout imposed by the NHL was illegal.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Commission des relations du travail dismissed the application of the players of the Club
de hockey Canadien Inc. because at the time the application was filed, the criteria to grant an injunction
was not met, which includes whether there was a serious question, irreparable harm, and preponderance
of inconveniences. Id. The main criterion that was not met was irreparable harm, as the players did not
lose any salaries or benefits as of September. Id. The Commission des relations du travail set a date to
reconvene in October. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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The arguments brought by both parties were valid. The players rightfully
argued that the Québec Labour Code applies to them because they work in
Québec and their employer is located in Québec. However, one issue regarding
the application of Québec’s legislation might complicate a decision in favor of
the players. Based on the facts of the 2012 NHL lockout, the lockout was illegal
because the NHLPA is not a certified union, which means that the players are
entitled to the same benefits that they would normally have if they were playing.
The problem is the legality of the lockout outside Québec. According to the
Québec Labour Code, the lockout would be illegal only in the province of
Québec. A positive decision from the Commission des relations du travail
would give the players bargaining power, even though it could invalidate a
league-wide lockout.
2.. Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario, and Manitoba Labor Laws
The four provinces, Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario, are
all governed by the common law legal system, meaning that precedent is an
important factor when deciding a particular issue. For example, because some
labor comissions and judicial instances already assert jurisdiction over
professional sports leagues’ labor relations disputes, if a dispute arose in a future
lockout, a board would have to recognize its jurisdiction. Each of the four
provinces has adopted statutes that regulate labor relations in its territory, and
courts in these jurisdictions have more flexibility to adapt the labor relations
laws to a specific situation.83
a. Alberta
The Alberta Employment Standards Code84 applies to every employer and
employee in Alberta.85 Therefore, the teams located in Alberta, the Calgary
Flames and the Edmonton Oilers, must comply with the Alberta Employment
Standards Code. Under the Alberta Employment Standards Code, employers
must follow certain administrative steps to impose a lawful lockout on their
employees. The Alberta Employment Standards Code provides for mediation.86
83. Common law courts and instances have more flexibility to adapt the laws, statutes, and
regulations to the reality because the system allows for the evolution of the law over time. In a civil law
system, it is more difficult to make the law evolve, and it often requires modification of the law, which
requires a robust process of legislation.
84. See generally Province of Alberta Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c E-9 (Can.).
85. Id. art 2(1) (stating, “This Act applies to all employers and employees, including the Crown in
right of Alberta and its employees.”).
86. Id. art 73(2)(b).
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Furthermore, a lockout is permitted only if certain conditions occur, such as
notice of a lockout, a vote on a lockout supervised by the Division of Labor
Relations, and the expiration of a CBA.87 If these conditions are not met, a
lockout may be declared illegal.
During the 2012 NHL lockout, players from the Calgary Flames and the
Edmonton Oilers filed a claim with the Alberta Labour Relations Board stating
that the lockout was illegal in Alberta.88 The players argued that they were

The Registrar may
(a) initiate any system of appeal management in order to expedite the fair resolution of
an appeal;
(b) with the agreement of the parties, appoint or facilitate the appointment of an
impartial third party mediator, fact-finder or other person to assist the parties in
settling their dispute;
(c) design processes to manage appeals that, at the option and with the agreement of
the parties, may be used to resolve an appeal.

Id. art 73(2).
87. See Province of Alberta Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c L-1, art 73 (Can.).
An employer or employers’ organization is entitled to cause a lockout if
(a) no collective agreement is in force, other than as a result of section 130,
(b) a lockout vote was held under this Division
(i) that remains current,
(ii) for which the results have been filed with the Board, and
(iii) that resulted in a majority in favour of a lockout,
(c) lockout notice is given in accordance with this Division,
(d) the lockout commences on the day and at the time and location specified in the
lockout notice or, if an amendment to the lockout notice is agreed to and is permitted
under this Division, on the day and at the time and location specified in the amended
lockout notice, and
(e) in a case where a disputes inquiry board is established before the commencement
of the lockout, the time limits referred to in section 105(3) have expired.

Id. art 74.
(1) A bargaining agent that is a party to a dispute may apply to the Board to supervise a
strike vote, and an employer or employers’ organization that is a party to a dispute may
apply to the Board to supervise a lockout vote.
(2) No strike or lockout vote shall be supervised while a collective agreement is in force
unless that agreement is in force pursuant to section 130.
(3) No strike or lockout vote shall be supervised until a mediator has been appointed under
section 65 and the cooling-off period referred to in subsection (7) of that section has expired.

Id. art 75.
88. Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp. and Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, 2012 CarswellAlta
1678, para. 2 (Can.).
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“employees” as defined by the Alberta Employment Standards Code and, as
such, their rights should be protected, even though the NHL filed for voluntary
recognition.89 Although the league did file for voluntary recognition, it did not
receive an answer to assess the legality of the lockout.90 The Alberta Labour
Relations Board dismissed the claim of the players, stating that because all of
the steps were not completed, it would not invalidate the lockout.91 Furthermore,
the Alberta Labour Relations Board did not want to support strategic tactics to
prevent negotiation discussion,92 believing its involvement would be
detrimental to the parties’ relationship.93 The Alberta Labour Relations Board
stated,
The result of such an intervention by this Board would be to
effectively remove the Calgary Flames and Edmonton Oilers
teams and players from the league-wide collective bargaining
process that the parties have historically engaged in and has
been established and recognized under the NLRA. The Calgary
Flames and Edmonton Oilers Clubs could not participate in the
league-wide lockout in which the rest of the League is engaged
as part of the current collective bargaining process. This is, in
part, the very reason the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board refused to grant certification of the B.C. NHLPA in its
application involving the Vancouver Canucks in Orca Bay.94
As demonstrated, the Alberta Labour Relations Board was reluctant to
assert jurisdiction over the NHL lockout. However, the fact that the NHL filed
for voluntary recognition of the lockout supported its argument that it had a
good faith basis for having the lockout declared legal. The main point to
remember is that the Alberta Employment Standards Code provides the Alberta
Labour Relations Board with the possibility to decline or assert jurisdiction on
matters that happen in its territory.

89. Id. at para. 31.
90. Id. at para. 28.
91. Id. at paras. 39, 41.
92. Id. at para. 40.
93. Id. at para. 42.
94. Id. at para. 42.
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b. British Columbia
The British Columbia Labour Relations Code95 includes similar provisions
with regard to mandatory administrative steps that must be fulfilled to have a
legal lockout. As in Alberta, all employers must vote prior to a lockout.96 This
95. British Columbia Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 244, art 61 (Can.).
96. Id. art 61(1).
(1) If 2 or more employers are engaged in the same dispute with their employees, a
person must not declare or authorize a lockout and an employer must not lock out his
or her employees until a vote as to whether to lock out has been taken by all the
employers in accordance with the regulations, and a majority of those employers who
vote have voted for a lockout.
(2) If on application by a person directly affected by a lockout vote or an impending
lockout, or on its own behalf, the board is satisfied that a vote has not been held in
accordance with subsection (1) or the regulations, the board may make an order
declaring the vote of no force or effect and directing that if another vote is conducted
the vote must be taken on the terms the board considers necessary or advisable.
(3) Except as otherwise agreed in writing between the employer or employers'
organization authorized by the employer and the trade union representing the unit
affected,
(a) if a vote is taken under subsection (1) and the vote favours a lockout, a person must
not declare or authorize a lockout and an employer must not lock out his or her
employees except during the 3 months immediately following the date of the vote, and
(b) an employer must not lock out his or her employees unless
(i) the trade union has been served with written notice by the employer that the
employer is going to lock out his or her employees,
(ii) written notice has been filed with the board,
(iii) 72 hours or a longer period directed under this section has elapsed from the
time written notice was
(A) filed with the board, and
(B) served on the trade union, and
(iv) if a mediation officer has been appointed under section 74, 48 hours have
elapsed from the time the employers are informed by the associate chair that the
mediation officer has reported to him or her, or from the time required under subparagraph (iii) of this paragraph, whichever is longer.

(4) Despite subsection (3) (b) (iii), the board may direct an employer to give more
than 72 hours' notice of a lockout, on application or on its own motion, for the
protection of
(a) perishable property, or
(b) other property or persons affected by perishable property.

(5) If the board makes a direction under subsection (4), the board
(a) must specify the length of the written notice required, and
(b) may specify terms it considers necessary or advisable.
(6) If facilities, productions or services have been designated as essential services under
Part 6 and a lockout that affects those facilities, productions or services does not occur on
the expiry of the 72 hour period referred to in subsection (3) (b) (iii) or the longer period
specified under subsection (5), the employer must give to the board and the trade union a
new lockout notice of at least 72 hours before commencing a lockout.
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vote is subject to the approval of the British Columbia Labour Relations Board
because the vote must comply with the British Columbia Labour Relations
Code, including giving seventy-two hours’ notice to the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board and trade union.97 Furthermore, the majority of
employers shall vote in favor of a lockout for it to be legal.98 If this
administrative step is not fulfilled, the lockout is illegal.99 The British Columbia
Labour Code also provides that both parties must negotiate in good faith,100 a
duty that is also provided by the NLRA. The jurisdiction of the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board was challenged prior to the 2012 NHL lockout.
In 2007, the Orca Bay Club and the NHL asked the British Columbia
Labour Relations Board to take jurisdiction over the issue that “a separate
bargaining unit including only the Vancouver Canucks would be an appropriate
bargaining unit under the Code.”101 The British Columbia Chapter of the
National Hockey League Players’ Association (BC-NHLPA) sought
recognition as the official union of the Vancouver Canucks players.102 On the
other hand, the NHL and Orca Bay argued that “the Canucks players had
voluntarily chosen to be part of a league-wide collective bargaining
relationship,” and during previous negotiations, the players bargained under the
NHLPA umbrella.103 In the final decision, the British Columbia Labour
Relations Board was reluctant to intervene between the two parties due to their
history, the nature of the structure of their relationship, and the way their
relationship functions.104 It was established that
The Board has no jurisdiction to grant an application for
certification on any terms other than under the provincial
legislation; however, where those terms are met, the
employer’s preference for another bargaining unit
configuration in another jurisdiction cannot stand as a bar to the

Id. art 61.
97
Id. art 61(3)(b)(iii).
98. Id. art 61(1).
99. See id.
100. Id. art 11.
101. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship v. British Columbia Chapter of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’
Ass’n, 2007 CarswellBC 3314, para. 1 (Can.). In this case, the British Columbia Chapter of the NHLPA
applied for certification to the British Columbia Labour Relations Board. Id. at paras. 5–6.
102. Id. para. 6.
103. Id. para. 9.
104. Id. para. 36.
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Board exercising its jurisdiction under the Code.105
The British Columbia Labour Relations Board established that it has
jurisdiction over the employees and employers working in British Columbia.106
In its decision, the British Columbia Labour Relations Board determined that
the NLRB did not have the power to certify a bargaining unit in Canada and it
also did have the power to prevent labor organizations from applying for
certification.107 Therefore, even though the NHLPA is not a certified unit in
British Columbia, the British Columbia Labour Relations Board can still look
at disputes that implicate them.108
It is clear that even though the NLRA applies to the relationship between
the NHLPA and the NHL, the law of British Columbia still applies and the
British Columbia Labour Relations Board may review labor relations disputes
in British Columbia. Nevertheless, as it was explained in Edmonton Oilers
Hockey Corp. & National Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, the British
Columbia Labour Relations Board did not get involved in the labor disputes to
avoid involvement in labor relations that implicated actors other than just the
Vancouver Canucks players and the club owner.109 This is a crucial element of
the British Columbia Labour Relations Board’s holding because by not
intervening, it would have given almost full jurisdiction to its counterpart, the
NLRB.
c. Ontario
In the Province of Ontario, the Ontario Labour Relations Act110 regulates
labor relations. The Ontario Labour Relations Act applies to all persons who
work in Ontario.111 Its jurisdiction over professional sports personnel who
provide work services in the province has been established in multiple cases;
two of these cases are highly important to the subject discussed in this section.
In a case involving an MLB team, the Toronto Blue Jays, regarding the use of
replacement umpires, the Ontario Labour Relations Board decided that the
umpires were working regularly and customarily in Ontario. This meant that the
105. Id. para. 35.
106. See Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship & NHLPA, 2005 CarswellBC 4555, para. 29 (Can.).
107. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship v. British Columbia Chapter of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’
Ass’n, 2007 CarswellBC 3314, para. 35 (Can.).
108. See id. para. 29.
109. Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp. & Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n, 2012 CarswellAlta
1678, para. 42 (Can.).
110. See generally Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1995, c. 1 (Can.).
111. Id.
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Ontario Labour Relations Act applied and the Ontario Labour Relations Board
had jurisdiction over the players and the teams working in its territory.112 In
National Basketball Referees Ass’n v. National Basketball Ass’n,113 the Ontario
Labour Relations Board upheld an analogous decision.
The Ontario Labour Relations Act provides multiple steps that must be
encountered prior to declaring a legal lockout when no CBA is in place.114 One
step is mandatory conciliation. In such a case, the Minister of Labour will
appoint a conciliation officer or a mediator.115 Within fourteen days of this
appointment, the conciliator reports to the Minister of Labour regarding the
endeavour.116 The conciliator determines if the parties are reconcilable. If so,
the conciliator can allow them to get back into the collective bargaining process.
Following the meeting, this person shall produce a report to the Minister of
Labour. The report is produced to the Ontario Labour Relations Board, which
determines if a conciliation board should be appointed. If it is advisable,
meaning that there is a window for the collective bargaining process to continue,
112. Ass’n of Major League Umpires v. Am. League & Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 1995
CarswellOnt 1524, para. 13 (Can.). In this case, the Association of Major League Umpires filed an
unfair labor practice claim against the American League and National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs and the Toronto Blue Jays Baseball Club. Id. at para. 1. The Ontario Labour Relations Board
found that labor relations are subject to the application of the Ontario Labour Relations Act. Id. at para.
13. Furthermore, it stated that an umpire who worked regularly and customarily in Ontario is an
employee as defined in the Ontario Labour Relations Act. Id. Consequently, “Any lock-out of umpires,
at this time, in the Province of Ontario would be unlawful in Ontario because neither the Leagues nor
the Umpires' Organization have triggered the compulsory conciliation process which is mandatory in
this province before a lawful strike or lock-out can occur.” Id.
113. 1995 CarswellOnt 1620, para. 21. This case followed the lockout of the NBA’s
referees by the NBA for the 1995–1996 season. Id. at para. 11. The Ontario Labour Relations Board
decided that it had jurisdiction over the dispute because a team was located in Ontario, Canada. Id. at
para. 16. Therefore, the referees worked in Ontario. Id.
114. R.S.O. 1995, c. 1, art 79(2).
115. Id.
116. Id. art 20(1).
(1) Where a conciliation officer is appointed, he or she shall confer with the parties and
endeavour to effect a collective agreement and he or she shall, within 14 days from his or
her appointment, report the result of his or her endeavour to the Minister.
Extension of 14-day period
(2) The period mentioned in subsection (1) may be extended by agreement of the parties or
by the Minister upon the advice of the conciliation officer that a collective agreement may
be made within a reasonable time if the period is extended.
Report of settlement
(3) Where the conciliation officer reports to the Minister that the differences between the
parties concerning the terms of a collective agreement have been settled, the Minister shall
forthwith by notice in writing inform the parties of the report.

Id. art 20.
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a conciliation board will be appointed and a lockout shall not be declared during
the process. However, if the report states that it is not advisable to appoint a
conciliation board, the Minster of Labour will authorize the lockout. One
particularity of this provision is voluntary recognition of the conciliation
process. Written consent must be filed with the Ontario Labour Relations Board,
which may decide to accept or refuse the consent.
During the 2012 NHL lockout, the Minister of Labour in the Province of
Ontario, in his full discretion, gave permission to the Toronto Maple Leafs and
the Ottawa Senators to lock out their players.117 As such, the NHL did not have
to go through all the administrative steps to have a legal lockout. If the NHL did
not apply for voluntary recognition, the NHL would have needed to fulfill all
the administrative steps required by the law.118
d. Manitoba
It must be mentioned that a seventh team, the Winnipeg Jets, is located in
Winnipeg, Manitoba. Like all of the other Canadian provinces discussed,
Manitoba enacted its own labor relations law, the Labour Relations Act.119 The
law applies to NHL players who work in Manitoba because it is where they are
employed. During the 2012 NHL lockout, the NHLPA and the players of the
Winnipeg Jets did not file a suit to block the lockout; the NHLPA was still
exploring options, but it did not follow through.120 There are some particular
provisions in the Manitoba Labour Relations Act that could help the players
association. The main provision that could create issues with the NHL is article
87.1.121 This provision provides that either side may apply, in writing, to the
117. Sean Rainey, Is a Possible NHL Lockout Even Legal in Canada?, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 11,
2012), http://dailycaller.com/2012/09/11/is-a-possible-nhl-lockout-even-legal-in-canada/.
118. See R.S.O. 1995, c. 1, art 79(2).
119. Manitoba Labour Relations Act, C.C.S.M. 1988, c. L-10 (Can.).
120. Dave Stubbs NHLPA Looks to Quebec Labour Law to Halt Lockout, NAT’L POST (Sept. 10,
2012), http://news.nationalpost.com/sports/nhl/nhlpa-looks-to-quebec-labour-laws-to-halt-lockout.
121. R.S.O. 1995, supra note 118, art 87.1.
Where a collective agreement has expired and a strike or lockout has commenced, the
employer or the bargaining agent for a unit may apply in writing to the board to settle the
provisions of a collective agreement if
(a) at least 60 days have elapsed since the strike or lockout commenced;
(b) the parties have attempted to conclude a new collective agreement with the
assistance of a conciliation officer or mediator for at least 30 days during the period of
the strike or lockout; and
(c) the parties have not concluded a new collective agreement.

Id. art 87.1(1).
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Manitoba Labour Relations Board to ask them to settle the terms of a CBA.122
An application may be made once at least sixty days have passed since the
beginning of a lockout.123 This could be an interesting tactic that should be
analyzed by the players. The Manitoba Labour Relations Board has sole
discretion to accept the application.124 The Manitoba Labour Relations Board
has the power to require the parties to submit to conciliation, if it believes that
the parties are negotiating in good faith and could come to an agreement within
thirty days.125 The Manitoba Labour Relations Board will try to leave the
collective bargaining process in the hands of the parties.126 However, if the
Manitoba Labour Relations Board decides to accept the application following a
request to settle the terms of a CBA, these terms will be binding for one year.127
Other issues may arise if the players in Manitoba file such a claim because
the Manitoba Labour Relations Board would settle the terms of a CBA. The
settled terms would directly impact the other NHL players and teams because
the NHLPA and the NHL would have to comply with the terms of the CBA in
Manitoba. The critical determination in such a process would be defining the
bargaining unit and which players are covered by it. It is unlikely that such an
application would be filed, but it could be a measure to gain leverage in a
negotiation process.
e. Concurring Jurisdiction of Provincial Canadian Labor Law and American
Labor Law
In all of the common law provinces, a claim may be brought to a labour
relations board. The NHLPA will try to argue that a lockout is illegal based on
the different provincial Canadian labour relations laws. The NHL brought a
similar jurisdictional argument, stating that the respective provincial labour
relations laws did not apply to the relationship between the NHL and the
NHLPA.128 The NHL’s arguments relied almost strictly on previous practices,
mentioning that it always did business that way and the provincial Canadian
labour relations boards never interfered with the previous negotiations.129

122. Id.
123. Id. art 87.1(1)(a).
124. See id. art 87.1(1).
125. Id. art 87.2(1).
126. Id.
127. Id. art 87.3(5).
128. Grant Goeckner-Zoeller, Note, Extraterritorial Lockouts in Sports: How the
Alberta Labour Board Erred in Declining Jurisdiction over the NHL, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 101, 121
(2013).
129. Id.
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However, many decisions, such as Ass’n of Major League Umpires and Orca
Bay Hockey Ltd. Partnership, support the position that the provincial labor
relations laws applied—in addition to the NLRA—even if the boards ultimately
decided not to intervene.130 Challenges have been brought before labor boards
in Canada.
Furthermore, the NLRA might be enforced in Canada. To do so, a
provincial Canadian board must decline jurisdiction or establish that the NLRB
is better suited to deal with a specific issue than the courts or boards in
Canada.131 However, even if the NLRB exercised its jurisdiction in Canada, it
cannot override Canadian laws. The NLRB must consider provincial Canadian
laws in its decision. Canadian laws must be respected, which means that the
NHL should comply with all the administrative procedures to respect the laws
previously mentioned. On the other hand, the NHLPA’s main argument would
be that the NHL did not fulfill all of the administrative steps that were required
by the law to declare a legal lockout.132 During the last NHL lockout, only the
prior requirements to declare a lockout were fulfilled in Ontario, and that is only
because the law provides voluntary recognition. Otherwise, none of the
administrative steps in any of the other provinces were fulfilled, meaning that
the 2012 NHL lockout would have been illegal. Due to concurrent jurisdiction,
as established by different labour relations boards, a league must respect the
laws in place in the Canadian provinces. Over the years, concurrent jurisdiction
has been at the center of all disputes. Canadian labour relations boards tend to
agree with the players association regarding jurisdiction; however, some
provinces, such as Alberta, have been reluctant to enforce their jurisdiction.133

130. Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. P’ship v. British Columbia Chapter of the Nat’l Hockey League Players’
Ass’n, 2007 CarswellBC 3314, para. 35 (Can.); Ass’n of Major League Umpires v. Am. League &
Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 1995 CarswellOnt 1524, para. 13 (Can.).
131. Club de Hockey Canadien Inc. Ligue Nationale de Hockey c. Ass’n des Joueurs de la Ligue
Nationale de Hockey, 2005 QCCRT 0621 (Can.). During the 2004–2005 lockout, the players filed a
claim with the Commission des relations de travail (the Québec Labour Relations Board). Id. The
claim was denied based on forum non conveniens, stating that the NLRB would be the proper forum to
hear labor relations issues between the NHL and the NHLPA. Id.
132. Id.
133. An application was brought by the NHLPA, Chris Butler, Matt Stajan, Michael Cammalleri,
Blake Comeau, Derek Smith, Tim Jackman, Dennis Wideman, Jarome Iginala, Sam Gagner, Nick
Schultz, Shawn Horcoff, Ryan Whitney, Eric Belanger, Corey Potter, Mark Giordano, Mikael
Backlund, Ryan Smyth, Mikka Kiprusoff, Devan Dubnyk, Ryan Jones, Henrik Karlsson, Cory Sarich,
and Alex Tanguay, affecting the Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp., the Calgary Flames Hockey Club,
and the National Hockey League. See generally ALTA. LAB. REL. BOARD, AN APPLICATION BROUGHT
BY
THE
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, (2012), http://oilers.nhl.com/v2/ext/pdf/NHLDecision.pdf.
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3. Provincial Labor Law Remedies to Prevent or Stop an NHL Lockout
In terms of remedies under labor laws, due to concurrent jurisdiction,
Canadian labor laws offer more ways to end a lockout. In the 2012–2013 season,
the NHL lockout was considered legal in Québec, at least according to the
Québec Labour Relations Board’s interlocutory decision.134 However, a lockout
would be illegal in Québec if the NHLPA was recognized as a certified union
under the Québec Labour Code. A lockout would also be illegal in Alberta,
British Columbia, and Ontario if the NHL did not fulfill the required
administrative steps to declare a legal lockout in these three provinces.
Because Canadian jurisprudence has demonstrated interest in intervening in
labor relations between the NHL and the NHLPA, if the NHLPA brings a suit
in Canada, its negotiating power will likely increase. This tactic would put
pressure on the NHL to negotiate in good faith and find solutions that would
accommodate the NHLPA. The burden of a suit in Canada would be more
detrimental to the NHL because it is time-consuming and the risk of having the
provincial Canadian labour relations boards assert jurisdiction is increasing
every year. By pursuing claims under provincial labour relations law, allowing
the boards to enjoin the NHLPA’s claims, and obtaining injunctions against the
NHL, Canadian teams will face even greater monetary losses than their
counterparts in the United States.135 If such a claim is recognized in Canada, the
teams would have to pay their players during the regular season. One of the
reasons why the injunction was not granted in 2012 in Armstrong is that there
was no irreparable harm. Because the NHL season starts in October, the players
did not experience any loss or damages by not playing. The claim was decided
on September 21, 2012. The result of that claim might have been completely
different if the claim was decided in November. Therefore, if a lockout were
determined to be illegal in Canada, club owners would have to pay their players
during the season, even though no revenues are generated. This could influence
the negotiation, as not all the teams can afford to pay their players if no revenues
are generated. Another consequence, more specifically under Québec law, is
that penal provisions could apply. The NHL would have to pay a separate fine.
Provincial Canadian labour laws cannot be disregarded. For this reason, the
NHLPA may be able to invalidate or suspend a lockout under provincial
Canadian labor laws, unless the NHL would fully comply with the requirements
of these laws. These claims are ways to pressure the NHL, but nobody can avoid
134. Armstrong c. Club de Hockey Canadien Inc., 2012 QCCRT 0445 (Can.). By
dismissing the provisional order and maintaining the interlocutory decision, the
Commission des relations du travail kept the status quo on the work conflict, which means that until
further decision from the Commission, the lockout was legal at this moment in time.
135. Ozanian, supra note 5.
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the law.
To resolve conflicts between the different jurisdictions, the NHL would
have to ensure that it complies with provincial Canadian labour relations laws.
It was demonstrated earlier that Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario require
employers to fulfill administrative steps prior to declaring a lockout. In Ontario,
it seems, as the NHL did in a previous lockout, that the league could apply for
voluntary recognition and the conciliation process would be aborted; therefore,
this step would be recognized and would permit the league to declare a legal
lockout. In British Columbia, there is no equivalent to voluntary recognition. To
prevent claims being brought before the British Columbia Labour Relations
Board, the NHL would have to take a vote to declare a legal lockout. Once the
vote is taken, the board could permit a lockout. In Alberta, the same
administrative steps must be fulfilled. The only step that would be an issue is
mandatory mediation. This criterion is the hardest to fulfill. Usually,
demonstrating that both parties reasonably tried to negotiate may fulfill this
step; both parties can send their representatives. Normally, after an information
session on mediation, the parties can both agree to abort this step. Finally, in
Québec, the issue is certification. It might not be possible for the NHLPA to
obtain certification. The main problem is establishing who the labor unions
should represent by determining the proper bargaining unit and members.
Furthermore, it is prohibited in Québec to have multi-employer bargaining. As
a result, a lockout would not be legal in Québec. This could create problems
because the players who are working regularly in Québec would still be paid.
Consequently, provincial Canadian labour laws offer effective means for
players to suspend the lockout and maybe accelerate the negotiation process and
gain some leverage in negotiations. Provincial Canadian labour relations boards
have jurisdiction to hear disputes that arise in their territories. The remedies
provided are, nonetheless, limited. As established in Edmonton Oilers Hockey
Corp. and Orca Bay Hockey Ltd. Partnership, the labour relations boards do not
want to intervene in the collective bargaining process because their intervention
would be detrimental to the historical relationship between the NHL and the
NHLPA. Even though the laws offer effective means to prevent a lockout in
Canada, it is unlikely that a judgment in favor of the players in Canada would
enjoin a league-wide lockout. However, a judgment in favor of the players in
Canada would give leverage to the NHLPA in its negotiations with the NHL.
III. LEGALITY OF NHL LOCKOUT UNDER AMERICAN AND CANADIAN
ANTITRUST LAWS
Antitrust laws have become more important in recent years, such as when
the NFL players decided to disclaim interest in their union during the 2011 NFL
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lockout because they felt it was the only way for them to end the lockout.
Disclaiming interest in a union is a process where players vote to renounce
representation by their players association. Following this disclaimer, the NFL
Players Association (NFLPA) members that were non-unionized players sued
the NFL based on antitrust laws. Not long after this suit, different groups of the
NBA Players Association (NBAPA) filed antitrust lawsuits in California and
Minnesota federal courts. However, the NBAPA’s litigation did not go as far as
the NFLPA because the NBA players settled before going to court. Nonetheless,
arguments were brought under antitrust laws, and these arguments will be
explained in this section.
A. American Antitrust Law
The Sherman Act regulates antitrust in the United States.136 Courts have
enforced the Sherman Act over the years, and these courts have developed some
exemptions to adapt the Sherman Act to the unique business of sports. Antitrust
is described as the illegal restraint of trade that occurs from a contract.137
Antitrust laws promote procompetitive behaviors and, therefore, prohibit
anticompetitive behaviors.138
1. The Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act “prohibits monopolies and restraint of
trade.”139 It specifically states that it is illegal to restrain trade or commerce
between states by contract.140 To establish a violation of section 1, three
elements must be established: concerted action, interstate commerce, and
unreasonable restraint of trade. A concerted action is found when it is
established that an agreement was made among the institutions that are being
sued for antitrust violations. In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League, the court stated: “The key is whether the alleged ‘contract,
combination …, [sic] or conspiracy’ is concerted action—that is, whether it
joins together separate decision-makers.”141 In terms of professional sports
leagues, concerted action is easily demonstrated, as almost all the agreements,
rules, and regulations that a league adopts are the result of an agreement between

136. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2006).
137. Antitrust Labor Law Issues in Sports, SPORTS L., http://sportslaw.uslegal.com/antitrust-andlabor-law-issues-in-sports/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010).

CHARBONNEAU ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

140

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/16/2015 2:07 PM

[Vol. 26:1

club owners.
Interstate commerce is also an element that is easily established. All
professional sports leagues have teams that are located in different states across
the country. Each team plays against each other. During their work, players must
travel to other states. The main business of a professional sports league has
effects in multiple states. Consequently, the interstate commerce element is
established.
The third element that must be established by a claimant under section 1 of
the Sherman Act is an unreasonable restraint of trade. American Needle142
established that, to demonstrate this element, a rule of reason analysis must be
performed. A plaintiff must demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of the rule
that the plaintiff is complaining about. This first part requires a plaintiff to show
an adverse impact on competition in a relevant market. The application of the
relevant market analysis was provided in Fraser v. Major League Soccer
L.L.C.143 In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National Football
League (Raiders I), the plaintiff contested the decision to not allow the
relocation of an NFL franchise.144 The court established that there are two
markets that must be analyzed, the product market and the geographic market.145
The product market is what the employer and the employees are producing.146
In Raiders I, one party argued that the product was NFL football, while the other
defined the product as being all entertainment options.147 The geographic
market is the region in which the product is performed.148 Again, in Raiders I,149
one party defined the market as being the Southern California region, while the
other defined the market as the United States.150 Leagues will always tend to
define the market in the broadest way possible because the larger the market,

142. Id. at 186.
143. See generally 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). MLS operates the major soccer league in North
America. MLS has the power to bargain agreements and operates the league on a daily basis. Its tasks
include, not exclusively, recruitment, payment of salaries, negotiation, and signage of agreements with
broadcasters. In this case, Fraser, an MLS player, objected to the control of MLS over the players and
alleged violations of antitrust laws, such as Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 60. The court
had to conduct a market analysis to determine if MLS monopolized the industry of soccer. See
generally id. Fraser failed to demonstrate that MLS controlled the geographic and product market. Id.
at 55. In this case, the geographic market for elite soccer players was worldwide, not just North
America, as argued by the players. Id.
144. 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
145. Id. at 1392.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1393.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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the harder it is for a court to find that the league has control.
Once the first part of the rule of reason is established, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant who must show a procompetitive justification for the
imposition of the contested rule. Courts have accepted several procompetitive
justifications. Competitive balance has been a justification that has been highly
accepted by courts, as noted in American Needle.151 Another justification that
has been accepted is financial stability. In Sullivan v. NFL,152 the court
mentioned that if a rule permits the league to function efficiently and prevent
detrimental financial effects, it should be recognized as having a procompetitive
effect. Financial integrity and competitiveness are important aspects of a league.
To generate maximum revenues, club owners must work together for the best
interest of a league.
If a defendant is able to prove a procompetitive justification for the
challenged rule, the burden of proof shifts again to the plaintiff, who must
establish that the restraint is not necessary to achieve the procompetitive
justification. In Sullivan,153 the court found that there were other less restrictive
means for the NFL to achieve its goal, such as “modifying the NFL’s policy to
permit a club’s sale of minority, nonvoting shares of team stock to the public
with limits on the size of an individual’s holdings.”154
Finally, a jury will have to balance the positive and negative effects of a
restraint. If the restraint of trade is found to have a net anticompetitive effect,
the conduct will be declared illegal.155 However, if the net effects are found to
be procompetitive, the conduct will be found legal,156 and there will be no
antitrust violation.
Professional sports teams have been found to be interdependent of each
other. Economically, they cannot function properly if the league has multiple
CBAs. Teams need to collaborate to negotiate a CBA that will apply to all of
the teams. As a result, because teams have to work together for a league’s
benefit, teams are engaged in concerted action. Moreover, in professional
sports, teams are located in different states, as well as different countries. In
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs,157 it was established that
151. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 204 (2010).
152. Sullivan II v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1112–13 (1st Cir. 1994). In this case, the
challenged NFL policy regarded the prohibition of the sale of an ownership interest through a public
stock offering. Id. at 1095.
153. Id.
154. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 429.
155. Antitrust Labor Law Issues in Sports, supra note 137.
156. Id.
157. 180 N.L.R.B. 190, 190 (1969). “Baseball, like the other major professional sports, is now an
industry in or affecting interstate commerce . . . .” Id.
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sports leagues are engaged in interstate commerce.
The NHL, for example, is present in seventeen states in the United States
and five provinces in Canada. Therefore, the main analysis to establish an
antitrust violation will be based on the arguments brought to fulfill the
requirements of the rule of reason test. In contrast with federal labor law,
antitrust law permits employees to eliminate competition among the teams by
unionizing. As previously established, there are two types of exemptions under
antitrust laws: statutory exemptions resulting from the Clayton Act and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the non-statutory exemption.
In terms of antitrust, the defenses that are usually raised, and that were used
in Brady158 and Anthony,159 are related to the application of the Sherman Act.
One of the main defenses under antitrust law is that a league is a single entity
incapable of violating the Sherman Act;160 leagues claim that because sports
teams are interdependent, they should receive special treatment in terms of
antitrust.161 Sports are a unique business; teams must agree on common ground
rules for a league to function. As a result, it would be inappropriate if antitrust
laws applied to the interdependence of teams. Another argument that is
intrinsically linked to the first part is, that because of the interdependence of
teams, their actions would never pass an antitrust analysis;162 therefore, a league
should be exempt to protect the function of the league. Another argument that
has been used by leagues is that the rule of reason analysis places a strict burden
on the defendant and it is an unreasonable rule for the professional sports
industry.163 However, this argument has been rejected because the rule of reason
can be adapted to specific industries.
To win an antitrust claim, players must argue that allowing a league to lock
out players would constitute an irreparable harm,164 and, therefore, leagues
should not be allowed to do so. To establish this point, players must demonstrate
that the Sherman Act applies to the professional sports industry. In a broader
sense, players must argue that the Sherman Act applies to all agreements among
the employers (i.e., the teams) that restrain trade in the labor market.165 The
158. See generally Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
159. See generally Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, Anthony v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n,
No. 11-05525 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2011), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/california/candce/4:2011cv05525/247629/1.
160. Feldman, supra note 50, at 1267.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1225.
164. STEPHEN F. ROSS, SUMMARY OF LEGAL ISSUES ARISING IN THE CURRENT NFL LABOR
DISPUTE 8 (n.d.).
165. Id.
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Sherman Act was enacted to protect everybody from anticompetitive behaviors.
Secondly, players will have to demonstrate that the rule of reason analysis is a
straightforward standard that can apply to all industries,166 including
professional sports. This test has been applied over the years and has been
flexible enough to apply to all industries. This analysis has already been used in
the sports industry, as it was applied in National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,167 as well as in McNeil v.
National Football League.168 Another argument that has been raised is that the
statutory labor exemption does not protect an unreasonable restraint of trade
when workers waive their labor rights and do not negotiate a new CBA.169 In
this instance, players will argue that because their CBA expired, antitrust
scrutiny applies to prevent anticompetitive behaviors. Also, players are allowed
to benefit from antitrust protections because a certified union does not cover
them. For all of these reasons, players will argue that the Sherman Act applies
and that the leagues’ behaviors are an illegal restraint of trade.
2. Statutory Labor Exemption
The Clayton Act170 provides the statutory labor exemption. The main
section that applies to professional sports is section 17.171 The first section
provides that employees can group together and form a union, or in the case of
professional sports, a players association. It allows an employer in professional
sports to negotiate a CBA that will apply to all employees—all prospective and
current players. Once a union is formed and recognized by the NLRB, it
becomes protected from antitrust suits. The antitrust immunity applies to a
union only in limited cases. The designed labor organization must act in its own
interest. It shall not group with another labor organization. If it does, the
statutory labor exemption will not apply. The statutory labor exemption
supports free collective bargaining and gives the parties the opportunity to
bargain for their own CBAs that will regulate their working relationships.
3. Non-Statutory Labor Exemption
The non-statutory labor exemption was created to give full effect to the
NLRA. The exemption was developed to allow labor processes to work to the

166. Id. at 3.
167. 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984).
168. See generally 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
169. Feldman, supra note 50, at 1240.
170. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2006).
171. Id.
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fullest. Antitrust should not undermine this process. For example, in the NHL,
the organization is comprised of member clubs located in different states and
provinces. If the members chose to voluntarily group under one umbrella and
follow labor relations law, these decisions should be enforced. These groups
should not be limited by antitrust in terms of labor relations; this is why the
non-statutory labor exemption was developed. Historically, courts developed
the non-statutory labor exemption to ensure that labor laws regulate labor
relations,172 as established in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.,173 where the Court
broadly construed the scope of the non-statutory labor exemption. In this case,
a group of NFL players filed an antitrust claim against the football club
owners.174 The CBA expired in 1987.175 In 1989, the parties were still
negotiating.176 The NFL presented a developmental squad plan to the players
that would introduce a weekly fixed salary for squad players.177 The NFLPA
disagreed.178 The negotiation reached the point of impasse.179 Therefore, in June
1989, the League unilaterally implemented the development squad plan.180 The
main issue in that case was whether the players could bring an antitrust claim.181
The Court decided that because the matter satisfied the four criteria, the
non-statutory labor exemption applied182: “Th[e] conduct took place during and
immediately after a collective-bargaining negotiation. It grew out of, and was
directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process. It involved a
matter that the parties were required to negotiate collectively. And it concerned
only the parties to the collective-bargaining relationship.”183 Brown clearly
stated that the non-statutory labor exemption applies so long as there is a
collective bargaining relationship. For the non-statutory labor exemption to
apply, there must be a sufficient period of time that indicates a clear end point
in the relationship.184 The Court did not set a particular end point or period to
define when the exemption applies.185
172. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 603.
173. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
174. Id. at 235.
175. Id. at 234.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 235.
180. Id.
181. See generally 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
182. Id. at 250.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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The non-statutory labor exemption no longer applies when a collective
bargaining relationship dissolves. At this point, either party can bring an
antitrust claim. Prior to this point, the non-statutory labor exemption immunizes
the terms of the expired CBA from any antitrust challenge beyond impasse
because of the ongoing collective bargaining relationship. Therefore, to bring
an antitrust claim, a players association must end the collective bargaining
relationship. The most effective way to end a collective bargaining relationship
is through decertification, which allows a players association to bring a class
action claim under the antitrust laws. The non-statutory labor exemption
applies, generally, as long as there is an ongoing collective bargaining
relationship186 and the parties keep their respective status. However, a
disclaimer of interest or a decertification on the part of the players and a players
association might change the application of this exemption. It appears that a
disclaimer of interest might not be enough for the non-statutory labor exemption
to apply; however, through decertification, it is definitely possible for the
players to bring an antitrust claim.187
In Brady, the players voted to disclaim interest in their union. This
procedure was not strong enough to end the collective bargaining relationship,
which is why their request was denied. Statutory exemptions provide immunity
for a union’s unilateral actions that further players’ economic interests. As a
result, when players unionize, a league does not have to worry about antitrust
claims. However, without a union, any antitrust claim is possible.
4. Brady v. National Football League188
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was adopted to prevent courts from issuing
injunctions to end strikes, except in cases of violence or fraud.189 The
Norris-LaGuardia Act also allows employees to unionize and organize
themselves to form a labor organization that will represent the interests of the
employees in negotiations with an employer.190 In Brady v. National Football
League,191 the court, pursuant to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, prohibited federal
courts from issuing injunctions for lockouts that grew out of labor relations.192
Furthermore, the court stated that to have a labor dispute, there is no need to

186. Id.
187. See generally Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
188. Id.
189. Baumann, supra note 1, at 254.
190. Norris La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
191. Brady, 644 F.3d at 661.
192. Id. at 680–81.
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establish the existence of a union (i.e., a players association).193 The Eighth
Circuit concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives a federal court of
power to issue an injunction prohibiting a party to a labor dispute from
implementing a lockout of its employees.194 However, an injunction cannot be
granted for a lockout as a means to pressure the employees in the negotiation
process.195
Brady was decided in 2011.196 The CBA between the NFL and the NFLPA
was set to expire on March 11, 2011.197 The NFL expressed publicly that if an
agreement was not reached by the termination date, the NFL would lock out its
players.198 The players, who were aware of the NFL’s strategy,
disclaimed interest in the NFLPA on the expiration date of the CBA.199 As
previously mentioned, there are two ways to dissolve a union. The first way is
through a disclaimer of interest, which is an informal procedure, whereby the
players indicate their disinterest in being represented by their union by a
majority vote.200 The second way is by a decertification process, which is a
formal procedure through the NLRB.201 All represented players must vote,
under NLRB supervision, to decide whether they want to decertify the union.202
If the players have a majority, the players will go through the formal process of
decertification. Once the union is decertified, no union can represent the players
for a period of twelve months.203
Following this process in Brady, the players filed an antitrust suit, claiming
that the NFL engaged in a group boycott and a price-fixing agreement, which
was a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.204 The NFL locked out the
players on March 12, 2011.205 As a result, the players asked the district court,
through a preliminary injunction, to enjoin the lockout because it would cause

193. See id. at 675.
194. Id. at 680–81.
195. Id.
196. See generally 64 F.3d 661.
197. Id. at 663.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. MITTEN, DAVIS, SMITH & DURU, supra note 11, at 619.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663.
205. Id.
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the players irreparable harm.206 The court granted the players the injunction.207
Consequently, the NFL appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.208
The majority of the Eighth Circuit panel209 concluded that the injunction did
not comply with the Norris-LaGuardia Act.210 The court went through an analysis of the plain language of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.211 Section 101 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act states that “[n]o court of the United States . . . shall have
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent
injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.”212 The court
concluded that, even though the players disclaimed interest in the NFLPA, the
disclaimer did not end the labor relationship. As a result, the issue at stake grew
out of a labor dispute.213 The majority also analyzed section 104 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.214 The central point of the analysis was the consideration
of the employment relationship.215 Section 101 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
confirmed that an employer and an employee might be in an employment
relationship.216 As a result, the court concluded that section 4(a)217 prohibits a
federal court from issuing an injunction to stop a lockout that is being imposed
by an employer.218
Further, the court mentioned that an employer lockout is part of the
“‘interplay of the competing economic forces.’”219 The NFL’s argument was
that the disclaimer of interest, on the same day as the expiration of the CBA,
was mostly a sham.220 The court responded to this argument by stating:

206. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011). In their submissions
for an injunction, the players argued that “[t]hey [we]re [s]uffering, [a]nd [would] [c]ontinue [t]o
[s]uffer, [i]rreparable [h]arm” in the form of money damages; the irreparable harm to the players would
outweigh the harm to the NFL; “[t]he [p]layers . . . [e]stablished [a] [f]air [c]hance of [s]uccess on [t]he
[m]erits;” and “[t]he [p]ublic [i]nterest [did] [n]ot [f]avor [t]he ‘[l]ockout.’” Id. at 1034, 1038–39, 1041.
Consequently, the preliminary injunction was granted. Id. at 1043.
207. Id.
208. See Brady, 644 F.3d 661.
209. The three-judge panel majority was comprised of two judges. See generally 644 F.3d 661.
210. Id. at 661.
211. Id. at 679–80.
212. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
213. Brady, 644 F.3d at 673.
214. Id. at 675–76.
215. Id. at 676.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 101.
217. 29 U.S.C. § 104.
218. Brady, 644 F.3d at 680–81.
219. Id. at 678 (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Chi. River & Ind. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 40
(1957) (emphasis omitted)).
220. Id. at 667.
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Given the close temporal and substantive relationship linking
this case with the labor dispute between League and the Players'
union, we struggle at this juncture to see why this case is not at
least one “growing out of a labor dispute”—even under the
district court's view that union involvement is required for a
labor dispute. 221
Therefore, the distinction between a disclaimer of interest and a
decertification is crucial to determine when antitrust claims may be brought.
With respect to the district court, a clear decision should have been rendered
with regard to requirements to stop the non-statutory labor exemption from
applying. A disclaimer of interest should not be enough to permit an antitrust
law claim. A decertification should be the only mechanism available to the
players who file claims under antitrust law. It is the only permanent
mechanism that ends the labor relations between players and a players
association, and consequently, between a league and players association.
In his dissent, Judge Bye stated that by voting to end the NFLPA’s status,
the collective bargaining relationship terminated.222 Because the relationship
ended, the players were allowed to bring an antitrust claim.223 The judge pointed
out that the main issue was the endpoint of the relationship, which made a clear
demarcation between antitrust and labor law.224 The disclaimer of interest was
sufficient, in his view, to end the collective bargaining relationship, even though
with a disclaimer the players may decide to re-unionize at any point in time.225
As previously demonstrated, it seems problematic to validate a disclaimer
of interest to put an end to the labor relationship between a players association
and a league. A disclaimer of interest does not completely end the relationship
between the players and a players association. The players may reclaim their
interest at any point in time after their original vote. Consequently, it would be
unfair for a league to allow the players to benefit from labor law and antitrust
law and then benefit again under labor law. As a result, only decertification
should be considered the end point of a labor relationship to allow antitrust law
to apply.

221. Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 640 F.3d 785, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2011).
222. Brady, 644 F.3d at 687.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 685.
225. Id. at 687.
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5. Use of Antitrust Law to Enjoin a Lockout: Unresolved Issues
Antitrust claims, such as the claims made by the NFL and NBA players,226
are a good way to put pressure on a league. Even though Brady established that
a lockout could not be enjoined because the players used a disclaimer of interest,
a decertification might allow players to obtain an enjoined lockout from a court.
The main barrier prohibiting players from obtaining an injunction under the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is the demarcation between labor law and antitrust law.
Once there is an endpoint in the labor relationship, there is no doubt that an
injunction may be obtained. A disclaimer of interest is not sufficient to obtain
an injunction, as a disclaimer does not clearly end a relationship because it is
always possible for players to re-unionize. Consequently, in a potential future
lockout, even if the players disclaim interest in their union, they would probably
not gain the leverage they are seeking in a negotiation. The only way to gain
leverage would be to decertify their union and then file an antitrust claim. It
seems that decertifying a union would be highly efficient for players to gain
bargaining power. Moreover, if the players obtain an injunction, it would likely
enjoin a lockout and allow them to have access to their training facilities and
earn salaries.
In terms of jurisdiction, American law has generally prevailed. Through
antitrust law, players seek an injunction from a court that will enjoin a league’s
imposed lockout because it violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Through
antitrust claims, players could seek to recover damages for their lost revenues.
Nevertheless, in Brady the main purpose of the antitrust claim was to obtain an
injunction to stop the lockout. In Brady, the district court decided in favor of the
players.227 The Eighth Circuit vacated this decision because the injunction
violated the Norris-LaGuardia Act.228 The discussion regarding the recovery of
damages due to an anticompetitive lockout is still open for discussion. Under
the rule of reason analysis, it is possible that in a future claim, players will be
able to recover damages.
B. Canadian Competition Law
In Canada, antitrust is a matter of federal jurisdiction. The Competition
226. See generally id.; Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 159. In these two cases,
players from both the NBA and the NFL sued the leagues and sought an injunction to enjoin the
lockouts. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663; Class Action Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 159, at 24. In
the first instance, the NFL received a positive decision from the court. Brady, 644 F.3d at 682.
However, courts have shown some openness to the arguments of the players. This is one of the reasons
why antitrust claims are remedies for players to gain leverage in a lockout.
227. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 779 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998 (D. Minn. 2011).
228. Brady, 644 F.3d at 663 (referencing Norris La-Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006)).
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Act229 encompasses most of the principles that are found in the Sherman Act.
The Canadian Competition Act applies to professional sports, as well as to all
citizens. The Competition Act is the federal Canadian law that regulates
antitrust. It contains both civil and criminal provisions.230 The Competition
Bureau of Canada enforces the Competition Act.231 The purpose of the
Competition Act is to “expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world
markets while at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in
Canada.”232 The three important sections of the Competition Act are article 48.1
(Conspiracy Relating to Professional Sport)233 and articles 45 and 90.1
(Agreements or Arrangements that Prevent or Lessen Competition
Substantially).234 Article 48 was integrated into the Competition Act in 1976,
229. See generally Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34 (Can.).
230. See generally id.
231. Our Organisation, COMPETITION BUREAU (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00125.html.
232. Id. art 1.1; Our Legislation, COMPETITION BUREAU, http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00148.html (last modified Jan. 11, 2012).
233. R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, art 48.
(1) Every one who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person
(a) to limit unreasonably the opportunities for any other person to participate, as a
player or competitor, in professional sport or to impose unreasonable terms or
conditions on those persons who so participate, or
(b) to limit unreasonably the opportunity for any other person to negotiate with and, if
agreement is reached, to play for the team or club of his choice in a professional league
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable on conviction to a fine in the discretion of
the court or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both.
(2) In determining whether or not an agreement or arrangement contravenes subsection (1),
the court before which the contravention is alleged shall have regard to
(a) whether the sport in relation to which the contravention is alleged is organized on
an international basis and, if so, whether any limitations, terms or conditions alleged
should, for that reason, be accepted in Canada; and
(b) the desirability of maintaining a reasonable balance among the teams or clubs
participating in the same league.
(3) This section applies, and section 45 does not apply, to agreements and arrangements
and to provisions of agreements and arrangements between or among teams and clubs
engaged in professional sport as members of the same league and between or among
directors, officers or employees of those teams and clubs where the agreements,
arrangements and provisions relate exclusively to matters described in subsection (1) or to
the granting and operation of franchises in the league, and section 45 applies and this section
does not apply to all other agreements, arrangements and provisions thereof between or
among those teams, clubs and persons.

Id.
234. Id. arts 45, 90.1.
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and the goal was to permit professional sports leagues to subsist in Canada.235
Through this exception, the government recognizes the particularities of
professional sports leagues.236 It acknowledges that sports are unique and they
often involve an international aspect because all of the major professional sports
leagues have teams in two North American countries.237 The Competition Act
also recognizes teams within a league as a single economic unit238 because
teams need to work together for leagues to function properly and preserve
competitive balance. Therefore, due to this entwinement between clubs, the
rules of competition do not apply as strictly to professional sports leagues.
Moreover, professional sports leagues are usually international in nature.
As a result, article 48 of the Competition Act was added to also accommodate
foreign jurisdiction to include sports leagues performing in different countries,
states, or provinces, including Canada.239 Courts have used the reasonableness
standard to determine if an action violates the Competition Act.240 There are two
components of the standard: “(i) whether the sport is organized on an
international basis and, if so, whether any limitations, terms or conditions

(1) Every person commits an offence who, with a competitor of that person with respect to
a product, conspires, agrees or arranges
(a) to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of the product;
(b) to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets for the production or supply of
the product; or
(c) to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate the production or supply of the
product.

Id. art 45(1).
(1) If, on application by the Commissioner, the Tribunal finds that an agreement or
arrangement — whether existing or proposed — between persons two or more of whom
are competitors prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition
substantially in a market, the Tribunal may make an order
(a) prohibiting any person — whether or not a party to the agreement or arrangement
— from doing anything under the agreement or arrangement; or
(b) requiring any person — whether or not a party to the agreement or arrangement —
with the consent of that person and the Commissioner, to take any other action.

Id. art 90.1(1).
235. J. Kevin Wright & Jonathan Gilhen, A Note on U.S. Antitrust Law and Professional Sport:
American Needle and the Implications for Canadian Competition Law, 23 CANADIAN COMPETITION
REC. 66, 71 (2010).
236. See id.
237. Id. at 72.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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alleged should, for that reason, be accepted in Canada, and (ii) the desirability
of maintaining a reasonable balance among the teams or clubs participating in
the same league.”241 The Competition Act gives sports leagues flexibility in the
management of sports.242 As long as the limitations on competition are
necessary and reasonable, there will be no violation of antitrust.243 It appears
that “agreements relating to the granting and operation of franchises that have
the effect . . . of unreasonably limiting participation in professional
sports . . . are likely subject to [article] 48.”244 Scholars have mentioned that as
long as the leagues use regulations and agreements that are necessary to the
particular function of the league, player and franchise restraints are an
acceptable limitation.245 It is important to mention that article 4 of the
Competition Act exempts CBAs from the act.246 This exemption is similar to
the exemption that was developed in Brown v. Pro Football Inc., but the
meaning of the Competition Act gives a broader exemption in Canada.247
Nevertheless, it has usually been interpreted that Article 4 does not apply to
article 48; otherwise, article 48 would be irrelevant.248 However, once a CBA
expires, because there is no longer an agreement between an employer and an
employee, it seems like article 4 of the Competition Act would apply; therefore,
competition claims could be brought.
The general provision of the Competition Act prohibits ancillary restraint
of trade; the general provision states that it is “unlawful . . . to agree to fix
prices,” and “control the supply of a product,” among other prohibitions.249
Under the general regime, there will be a violation only when the persons
involved are competitors.250 Article 90.1 includes agreements between
competitors that do not fall into the provision of article 48, such as intellectual
property agreements and broadcasting.251 Even though there is a specific regime
to professional sports, it is limited to certain agreements.252 For all other
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 73.
246. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, art 4(1)(c) (Can.).
247. Stephen F. Ross, The Current State of Labour Relations in the National Hockey League,
COMPETITION BUREAU (Oct. 9, 2012), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/Ross/Current_State_of_Labour_Relations_in_the_NHL.pdf.
248. Id.
249. Wright & Gilhen, supra note 235, at 73.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. See id.
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agreements, the general regime shall apply.253 In terms of lockouts, the section
that will be used is article 48, which is the specific section that applies to
professional sports situations.254
It is important to note that articles 45, 48, and 90.1 cannot “be used to set
aside a [CBA].”255 Article 4 of the Competition Act states:
[C]ontracts, agreements or arrangements between or among
two or more employers in a trade, industry or profession,
whether effected directly between or among the employers or
through the instrumentality of a corporation or association of
which the employers are members, pertaining to collective
bargaining with their employees in respect of salary or wages
and terms or conditions of employment [are not subject to the
Competition Act].256
Article 4 is similar to the non-statutory labor exemption that is provided in
American antitrust law. However, because the Canadian courts have not had
many opportunities to interpret this section, some issues have not been
discussed. For example, it is not clear if the section applies to professional sports
leagues and CBAs that govern in the United States and Canada. If article 4 were
to apply, it would render the application of the other sections under the
Competition Act unnecessary. However, one can also argue that once a lockout
occurs and no CBA is in place, either party may bring an antitrust claim under
articles 45 or 48 of the Competition Act. It does not appear that a claim to
establish the validity of a lockout has been brought under the Competition Act
involving professional sports. Under the Competition Act, the validity of a
lockout would be subject to a softer test than under American law, as it would
be subject to the reasonableness analysis. It is unlikely that players would
succeed in this avenue, as article 48 of the Competition Act was created to
exempt professional sports from the normal principles that apply to other
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Yashin v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2000 CarswellOnt 3278, para. 44 (Can.). In this case, the
NHLPA initiated a grievance on behalf of Alexei Yashin against the NHL. Id. para. 1. The issue at
stake was whether Yashin’s contract expired on June 30, 2000, which would have allowed him to be a
free agent on July 1, 2000. Id. para. 33. However, because Yashin decided to sit out during the
1999–2000 season, the team alleged that Yashin owed it a season prior to becoming a free agent. Id.
para. 22. Jurisdiction and restraint of trade were alleged in this case. Id. paras. 27, 43. The court stated
that it had “no basis for the proposition that Section 48 of the Competition Act can be used to set aside
a collectively bargained agreement.” Id. para. 44.
256. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, art 4(1)(c) (Can.).
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businesses.
IV. POTENTIAL REMEDIES TO PREVENT FUTURE LOCKOUTS
With the growing business of the sports industry and the fact that it
generates more and more revenue each year, it is obvious that other lockouts
will occur or be used as a tool to pressure players associations during
negotiations. Lockouts are a legitimate, legal tool that may be used by a league,
but they should not be unduly used. Therefore, it is important to find solutions
to avoid future lockouts. A lockout gives leagues negotiating power. Even with
all of the remedies that players may use, they will never possess the same level
of power, unless the players strike. Players are the essential product of
professional sports leagues. The relationship between a league and the players
should be collaborative. One of the main issues that must be addressed in future
negotiations is concurrent jurisdiction. The best way to avoid conflict would be
for both parties to agree on a jurisdiction and establish that all matters are
subject to the NLRA. However, it is not possible to agree to circumscribe other
countries’ laws through a CBA, so even though this would be an ideal solution,
it might not be realistic.
The NHL and the NHLPA should collectively bargain a post-CBA
procedure in future negotiations. A post-CBA procedure would not waive the
NHL’s right to impose a lockout; rather, it would be a process between the
expiration of the CBA and a lockout or strike. This procedure would permit an
internal mechanism to comply with Canadian laws, while conserving the rights
provided in the NLRA. The current NHL CBA257 does not provide any
particular process in regards to what should happen once it expires. Article 7 of
the NHL CBA, regarding lockouts, only mentions that a lockout cannot be
declared when the current CBA is in effect.258
The future CBA should include terms of the current CBA that will remain
in effect until a new CBA is negotiated. The provision should include an
exception that would permit the CBA to comply with American laws and allow
the terms of the CBA to change after impasse. If included, the parties could then
include a provision that would submit the CBA to a specific jurisdiction.259 This
solution would be efficient only if both parties agree to it. The provision would
257. See generally COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE
NATIONAL
HOCKEY
LEAGUE
PLAYERS’
ASSOCIATION
(2013),
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_CBA.pdf.
258. Id. art. 7.1(b) (stating, “Neither the League nor any Club shall engage in a lockout during the
term of this Agreement.”).
259. The contractual legal implications and obligations have not been analyzed during research for
this Article. Extensive research should be done to establish a more detailed procedure and explanation
of the legal consequences of such an approach.
AND
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be in effect only until a second cycle of collective bargaining.
A solution for the NHL to avoid multiple claims in different jurisdictions,
if it still wants to use lockouts as an efficient tool, would be to create a formal
procedure that the league is required to follow prior to declaring a lockout. As
previously determined, to have a legal lockout in Canada, a league must fulfill
administrative requirements. Part of the administrative requirements would be
satisfied if a league has an internal procedure, such as the one proposed in this
Article. The first step of the proposed procedure would include a mediation or
conciliation process. Because the procedure affects both parties, it would have
to be collectively bargained for or mutually agreed upon. If the parties reach an
impasse during the negotiation, the parties would bring their dispute through the
mediation or conciliation process. The process does not force the parties to come
to an agreement, but it would require discussions between the parties.
Furthermore, having a neutral advisor would provide another perspective. The
parties would have to agree on which party would pay for the mediation or
conciliation. One proposition would be that the party who declares the work
stoppage would pay for a mediator or conciliator’s fees.
The mediation or conciliation process would serve as a step in between
negotiation and complete rupture of negotiations. A neutral party would
determine if there is any way to restart the negotiations. The neutral party should
be a sports labor relations expert, whom the parties pick from a list of names.
This first step would meet the mandatory mediation requirement under the
Alberta Employment Standards Code and show the intention of good faith
bargaining as provided in the British Columbia Labour Relations Code. It would
also give leverage to a league when it asks the Ontario Minister of Labour to
voluntarily recognize a lockout. The second step prior to declaring a lockout
would be to provide prior notice, which would satisfy one of the requirements
of the Alberta Employment Standards Code. The internal policy would indicate
a delay upon which notice must be sent prior to declaring a lockout. The third
and final step would be for club owners to vote on whether a league should lock
out its players. Even if the vote is not a supervised vote by any of the provincial
labour relations boards, a formal vote would support an argument that the club
owners put their best efforts into fulfilling all of the administrative steps that the
Canadian labour laws require. As a result, a players association would not be
able to challenge a lockout as illegal in these Canadian provinces. The league
would maintain the leverage it is attempting to obtain through a lockout.
Another avenue that both parties should explore is American or Canadian
legislation reform. Both parties should work towards a modification of the
Sherman Act, section 26b (Application of antitrust laws to professional major

CHARBONNEAU ARTICLE (DO NOT DELETE)

156

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

12/16/2015 2:07 PM

[Vol. 26:1

league baseball).260 All major professional sports leagues in North America
operate the same way as MLB. After including all of the professional sports
leagues under section 26b, the leagues should then seek to incorporate a
provision that would incorporate a statutory exemption to remedy the issue of
the non-statutory exemption. A provision regarding the beginning point of the
application of the Sherman Act should be defined. The title of this subsection
could be “The Application of this Act,” and the section could read,
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act shall apply to professional
sports leagues after a labor relationship between a players
association and a professional sports league terminates. With
respect to the labor relationships between players associations
and a professional sports league, the relationships will be
considered terminated once (1) a collective bargaining
agreement expires; and (2) a union representing the players is
decertified.
The creation of this section would give a clear advantage to a league when
negotiating because it would allow a league to negotiate without the burden of
a potential antitrust claim. This section would also give some benefits to players
because they would have a specific section that would allow them to obtain an
injunction. Once the protection of labor law no longer applies, players could use
an injunction as a strategy against a league. However, players would need to
decertify their union to begin this process.
Another option for a league is reform of provincial Canadian legislation to
include the process of voluntary recognition that exists under the Ontario
Labour Relations Code and the Alberta Employment Standards Code. Adding
this process under the British Columbia Labour Relations Code would facilitate
the process of declaring a lockout. The only concern a league would face is
filing for voluntary recognition in due time. In Québec, the issue is not exactly
the same. During the lockout in Armstrong, the players sought to be recognized
as employees and have the NHLPA recognized as a valid union under Québec
law. A league cannot force a players association to be a recognized union, and,
even if this practice was allowed, it does not mean that it would be accepted by
the Commission des relations du travail. As such, a league may seek to add an
exemption in the Québec Labour Relations Code for professional sports.
A potential solution to enjoin a lockout that could give leverage to
players, if none of the legislative reforms proposed are implemented, is an
260. 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2014).
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antitrust claim. As demonstrated previously, if players are not unionized, they
may pursue a claim under the Sherman Act, and historically, players have been
successful in doing so. The main issue is determining when players can bring
such a claim. There is currently a grey area in establishing whether a disclaimer
of interest is sufficient to permit an antitrust claim. Brown established that
decertification of a union permits players to challenge a league for antitrust
violations. However, if players decide to proceed through a disclaimer of
interest, it might not be enough. The particularity of a disclaimer is that players
may decide to unionize and de-unionize whenever they want.
There is no limitation regarding when a labor relationship terminates. As a
result, it seems that a disclaimer of interest would be advantageous to a league,
while a decertification would be an advantage for players. This process must be
done carefully because once players decertify their union, the players cannot be
represented by a union for a period of twelve months, which would mean that
leagues and clubs could negotiate individually with players. An antitrust claim
gives leverage to players because decertification can be costly to a league, which
might force a league to settle, and as a result, agree to the demand of the players
who now have a negotiating advantage.
There is no perfect solution that would satisfy both parties. However, in the
long term, legislative reform is the best possible solution because reform would
create specific legislation regarding only professional sports.
Professional sports are a unique business that cannot be compared to other
industries because the revenues and expenses at stake are not comparable. In the
short term, a league should review the provincial Canadian labour laws and
lobby to modify them because reducing the avenues for a players association to
enjoin a lockout would allow a league to gain leverage in future CBA
negotiations.
In the long term, both a league and a players association should lobby to
reform American antitrust law. This process should be in conjunction with the
other professional sports leagues that would be affected by the reform, including
the NBA and the NFL. Reform would be a long and thorough process, but it
would be beneficial to both parties and would reduce the use of pressure tactics,
such as lockouts, in the collective bargaining relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
After analyzing the different laws from Canada and the United States, it is
obvious that there is concurrent jurisdiction in the application of laws to
professional sports leagues. Under labor law, Canadian courts and labour
relations boards have established jurisdiction over professional athletes and
teams located on Canadian territory. In addition to American antitrust law,
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Canadian antitrust law applies to professional sports leagues, clubs, and athletes.
Furthermore, this application must be enforced when teams in the other country
have an important market power within a league. For example, in professional
hockey, the seven Canadian hockey clubs have most of the economic power, as
they generate a large part of the NHL’s revenues. Because concurrent
jurisdiction is established, in a future lockout, professional sports leagues will
have to be more careful in declaring a work stoppage because they will want to
ensure they are complying with Canadian laws.
While players and players associations have multiple remedies to prevent
or stop a lockout, the majority of these remedies are ineffective. The remedies
available are intended to enjoin a lockout or provide players with tools to gain
leverage in negotiating a new CBA. This is an advantage for a players
association and players who previously lacked bargaining power in the
negotiations. Professional sports leagues should be worried and try to look for
remedies to avoid these concurrent jurisdiction issues. It must be noted that
labor law claims could be counterbalanced if a league fulfills all of the Canadian
administrative requirements prior to declaring a lockout. If the requirements are
fulfilled, a league would eliminate the leverage that a players association gains
if it is successful in its Canadian labour law claims. With all of the major
professional sports leagues looking to expand abroad, these jurisdictional issues
will become the center point of negotiation. The leagues will have to keep in
mind that, in Europe, as well as in Canada, the system does not give labor
exemptions like the American system. Ideally, to prevent potential issues, the
four major professional sports leagues should collaborate with the players
associations to find ways to prevent potential work stoppage problems. This
Article proposes that the best way to avoid work stoppage issues is to negotiate
a process that allows negotiations to continue with the help of an independent
third party who would reduce the tension between a players association and a
league. Tribunals are not the best method to regulate the labor relationship in
professional sports. Therefore, it would be beneficial for both players
associations and leagues to voluntarily and collaboratively develop a process
that will leave labor relations in the players associations and leagues’ control,
or in the hands of an expert in professional sports.

